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TRADE RULES AND TRADE CONFERENCES: THE FTC
AND BUSINESS ATTACK DECEPTIVE PRACTICES,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS
THiE Federal Trade Commission seeks to protect both competitors and
consumers from commercial deception, unfair competition, and violations of
the antitrust laws.1 As originally intended by Congress, the role of the Com-
mission did not include the direct protection of consumers as such from com-
mercial deception. 2 Rather, the Commission was conceived as an agency to
protect competitors and prevent the further growth of monopoly.3 Thus the
enforcement procedures provided by the Federal Trade Commission Act 4
and its companion legislation, the Clayton Antitrust Act,r were designed to
halt those predatory and collusive practices believed to be the methods em-
ployed in advancing monopolistic schemes.0 Today, however, the scope of the
1. FTC ANN. REP. 2, 3 (1952) ; Zealous Men of FTC, Fortune, Feb. 1952, p, 106.
2. See Rublee, Original Plan and Early History of the Federal Trade Commifssion,
11 AcAo. POL. Sc. PRoc. 117-18 (1926). For study of limited early operations of the
Commission in the field of commercial frauds and misrepresentation, see Handler, False
and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22 (1929).
3. Political pressure culminating in the establishment of the Commission bad been
stimulated by congressional opposition to the "Rule of Reason" for Sherman Act interpre-
tation announced by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United Statds, 221 U.S.
1 (1911). President Wilson and dominant elements in Congress wanted specific legisla-
tion, enforced by an administrative agency, to substitute for judicial discretion under the
"Rule of Reason" doctrine. For an exhaustive account of developments leading tip to
the drafting and passage of legislation creating the Commission, see GASKILL, Tn.
RGULATION Or CoMPM1roN, cC. I-IV (1936) (hereinafter cited as GASKILL); Thomp-
son, Highlights in the Evolution of the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEo. WAsil. L.
Rav. 257 (1940).
4. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (Supp. 1952).
5. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1946) (Supp. 1952). The Act
bars several practices such as exclusive dealing, tie-in contracts, merger of competing
corporations, and interlocking directorates, where such practices would substantially
lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. For tile 1936
Robinson-Patman Amendment, see note 60 infra.
6. The Clayton Act's generalities and many qualifying phrases made it fall far short
of the original goal of its proponents: i.e., to forbid, item by item, all the "actual pro-
cesses and methods of monopoly . . . and hurtful restraints of trade" which had been
disclosed by experience, and to provide stiff criminal penalties for violations of the
prohibitions. H.R. Doc. No. 625, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1914). Failure to achieve this
goal was one of the principal factors leading to the creation of the FTC and the
delegation to the Commission of considerable regulatory powers, under the general
mandate to prevent "unfair methods of competition." It was hoped that a Commission
might control the activities which Congress was apparently unable to list specifically.
GASKiLL 40 et seq. Proponents of this course of action thought that "unfair practices"
were a principal cause of monopoly and thus believed that the Commission would function
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Commission's work has been vastly expanded. It includes, for example, con-
trol of the deceptive advertisements in the nation's 20,000 publications and
other advertising media,7 control of affirmative labeling of content for tex-
tile products, furs, and drugs,8 and enforcement of the far reaching anti-
discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton
Act.9 Yet the means of Commission regulation are still basically those pro-
vided for use against a far smaller number of monopolistic offenders, and its
staff is smaller than it was thirty-five years ago.10 Recently, especially since
1946, the Commission has attempted to streamline its antiquated enforcement
procedures and enhance its enforcement impact by developing methods of
informal enforcement and industry-wide cooperation.
FTC ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
Deceptive Practices and Unfair Competition
Traditionally, the Commission has sought to exercise control over illegal
competitive practices and product misrepresentation by issuing cease and
to control "trusts" in their incipiency. The specific practices discussed in congressional
debate corresponded closely to the predatory practices of large corporations. BiAlsDE1L,
Tnn FErRA TRADE Comnsissiox 19 (1932).
7. FTC ANN. REP. 50 (1952). And in the advertising fidd itself, the area to L2
controlled expands constantly: $200 million a year was spent on advertising in 1i9; in
1951 the figure rose to $6.5 billion. Id. at 10. And see notes S, 14 infra.
S. Specific authority to prevent the "false advertisement" of foods, drugs, medical
devices, and cosmetics is contained in §§ 12-16 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
added by amendment in 1938. 52 STAT. 114 (1938), 16 U.S.C. §§ 5-6 (1946). Repre-
sentation that oleomargarine "is a dairy product" is barred by § 15(2), added by
the Oleomargarine Act, 64 STAT. 20 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (2) (Supp. 1952). The
Commission administers the Wool Products Labeling Act, 54 STAT. 1123 (19401, 15
U.S.C. § 68 (1946), which requires all products represented as containing xuol to dis-
close by tag, label, or other mark: (1) the ind and percentage of each different fiL.r
contained in the product, including the respective percentage of "'ool," "rel'rczezsed
wool," and "reused wool"; (2) the maximum percentage of loading and adulterating
material, if any; and (3) the identity of the manufacturer of the weol product or oi a
person marketing the product in intrstate commerce. See FTC A,:J:. R P,. 57-8 (1952).
Within the past year the Commission has begun to administer the Fur Products Labeling
Act, 65 STAT. 175 (1951), 15 U.S.C. §§ 69c-j (Supp. 1952), requiring similar disclosures
on fur products giving the true English name of the animal producing the fur (as set
forth in a Fur Products Name Guide), telling when dyed or bleached fur is used, and
stating whether a substantial part of the product is composed of used scraps, or waste
fur remanents. The Administration of both Acts is conducted by the Commissioa',
Division of Wool and Fur Labeling. FTC ANN. REP. 59-60 (1952). Additionally, the
Commission has enforcement duties under the Lanham Trade Mark Act, W9 STAx. 4127
(1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1946) and various amendments to the original Federal
Trade Commission and Clayton Acts.
9. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
10. In 1918, the Commission employed 6S9 perswns; in 1939, 687; but as of Nov. 3,
1952, only 657. FTC ANN. RaP. 10 (1952). In roughly the same period, along with thtf
Commission's increased duties, the number of business firms operating in the United
States has doubled, and the gross annual product increased threefold. ]bid.
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desist orders directed against specific practices of individual offenders.11
Responsibility for administering such control procedures rests with the FTC's
Bureau of Antideceptive Practices. 12 When complaints" or investigations
by the Bureau staff 14 indicate the use of deceptive practices which a firm
under the Commission's jurisdiction 'r will not voluntarily abandon, a formal
complaint may be issued against the offender. Evidence of violations dis-
covered by the Bureau and respondent's defense are then presented in formal
hearings conducted by an independent trial examiner. 10 This trial examiner
makes an initial decision which includes: (1) findings and conclusions, with
supporting reasons, upon all material issues of fact, law, or discretion pre-
sented in the record; and (2) an appropriate cease and desist order enjoining
further use of any specific practices found to be illegal.17 These orders
become FTC decisions 18 unless appeals are taken to the Commission or
unless the Commission on its own initiative dockets a case for review.10
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, once a cease and desist order
becomes final,20 further violations detected by the Commission may result in
imposition of heavy fines.21 However, a firm which wishes to continue use
11. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920); Mennen
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923). For discussion see Freer,
Federal Trade Commission Procedure and Practice, 8 GEo. WASH. L. RV. 316, 330
(1940).
12. FTC ANx. REP. 40 (1952).
13. Complaints from outside sources alleging deceptive practices totaled 2,544 inl
fiscal 1952. Id. at 51.
14. The Division of Investigation of the Bureau maintains a continuous sampling
survey of major advertising media. The Division examined a total of 636,096 advertise-
ments during fiscal year 1952. Its field representatives often detect misbranding and
misrepresentation and other unfair and deceptive practices throughout the United States.
Ibid. In admhinistration of the Wool Products Labeling Act, the Bureau's Division of
Wool and Fur Labeling inspected, by sampling method, 20,823,954 wool products during
fiscal 1952. Id. at 57.
15. The jurisdiction of the FTC with respect to interstate commerce has been strictly
construed, and limited to matters directly relevant to interstate commerce. Federal Trade
Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 351-5 (1941).
16. FTC Rules of Practice, Rule 14, 16 CoDE FED. RuEs. § 2.14 (Supp. 1950) ; FTC
ANN. REP. 124 (1951). For status of these examiners, see id. at 8; DAvis, ADmINss'r-
Tim LAW 386 et seq. (1951).
17. FTC Rules of Practice, Rule 22, 16 CODE FED. REGs. § 2.22 (Supp. 1950); FTC
ANN. REP. 127 (1951).
18. Ibid.
19. FTC trial examiners issued 109 initial decisions during the fiscal year 1952t
54 were adopted by the Commission without appeal or review; 5 were reviewed by the
Commission on its own motion; and 34 respondents appealed their initial decisions
to the Commission. Of this group, 23 were pending at the close of this fiscal year, 8 were
adopted, 2 modified, and 1 reversed. The remaining 16 initial decisions had been issued
but not acted upon. at the close at the fiscal year. FTC ANN. RE'. 80 (1952).
20. See FTC Act, §§ 5(c), (g), 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(Supp. 1952).
21. Punitive sanctions for violations of a cease and desist order are imposed for
violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C, §
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of a challenged practice can, by appeals, postpone the effective date of the
order by as much as five years.2 2 About half of the initial trial examiner
decisions are carried to the Commission for review, - 3 and further appeal may
be taken to the circuit courts and the Supreme Court.2 4 Even under the most fav-
orable conditions at least 6 months usually elapse before a cease and desist order
becomes effective, following discovery of a violation.2  Fortunately, most
offenders do not use the arsenal of delaying tactics to the limit. In fact, many
firms prefer to drop challenged practices after a relatively informal settlement
with the Commission rather than face the heavy legal costs and adverse pub-
licity incident to formal FTC prosecutions. 2 10 This willingness to settle,
coupled with mounting backlogs of work and repeated criticisms of Commis-
sion dependence on statutory cease and desist orders as the primary method
for correcting violations, 2 7 have led to several recent procedural changes to
facilitate informal settlement of individual deceptive practice cases.es
In cases of non-flagrant deception where it appears that the defendant acted
in good faith and will not repeat the offense, the Bureau staff may now end
the proceedings without publicity merely by closing the file on receipt of a
letter or affidavit of discontinuance2 9 However when a violation is considered
45 (1) (1946), but not the Clayton Act. See note 48 infra. Violations of cease and desist orders
issued under the former act are punishable by a maximum fine of 5,wo{ for each
separate violation of the order. In the case of a continuing violation, each day of tle
violation is considered a separate offense. 60 STAT. 21 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (Supp.
1952).
22. At the end of fiscal year 1952, proceedings to review five Commission orders
against false advertising were pending in federal courts. FTC A-..-. RFX. 56, 57 (1952).
The FTC's initial formal complaints against advertising of three of these five c,mpanies
had been issued seven or more years previously. 3 CCH Tm.,r.z REG. Ri,., FTC Dwc.
Nos. 5342 (1945), 4970 (1943), 4960 (1943), 4772 (1942).
23. See note 19 supra.
24. During fiscal year 1952, 29 cases were decided in federal courts oin petitions for
review of Commission cease and desist orders with the Commission's order being reversed
in only one. Fourteen cases were pending at the close of the fiscal year. FTC A;: . RrA.
54 (1952). During this same period 75 complaints and 10 orders to cease and desist were
issued. Id. at 41.
25. GELruE, ADVERTIsING AT THE CRossRoADs: FEDMRAL REGULATIO!. VS. V(,LUNTAny
CorroLs 174 (1952).
26. Id. at 168. There have been assertions that the Commission has made oppressive
use of the stipulation procedure in obtaining orders against innocent respondents who
wish to avoid the expense and publicity of a formal proceeding. Apparently no indepeend-
ent investigation of these charges has been made. See D.wxs, . ,-IIj;IszTn'.T.v LAw 152
(1951).
27. For criticism of FTC formal enforcement procedures, see, e.g., REP. ATr'Y Ga:.
Cotex. AD. Paoc. 42 (1941) ; Hooinm Comm. REp. Tasr, ForcE oN RzG. CoQs,. (1949).
28. For FTC changes partially in response to the criticism, see FTC AN::. Rm. 77
(1952) ; id. at 82 (1951) ; id. at 5 (1950). For detailed discussion, see Proposals for
Reform of FTC Procedures, 40 T.M. REP. 197 (1950).
29. During the fiscal year 1952, 269 cases, including 143 scheduled investigations and
126 preliminary inquires, were settled by such methods. FTC AN:. R'. 53 (1952).
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serious and there is need for greater assurance that the deception will not be
repeated, a "stipulation agreement" may be offered a respondent s0 Such
agreements consist of findings containing the jurisdictional facts and a state-
ment of the acts and practices which the FTC had reason to believe were un-
lawful, together with an order to cease and desist.8 ' Both findings and order
are entered by consent of the parties . 2 Stipulations enable the Commission
to obtain an effective cease and desist order without resort to time-consuming
formal trials.33 They also benefit the respondent firm, because it may admit
only jurisdictional allegations and not prior use of practices enjoined. Thus,
such stipulations have no res judicata effect on the issue of past violations in
any subsequent FTC proceedings against the offending firm.34 Similar con-
sent settlements may also be made in formal proceedings prior to the taking
of evidence on a complaint.8,
But even if the FTC were considerably enlarged, these individual settlement
methods would be unsatisfactory as a fair and effective means of coping with
widespread unfair or deceptive practices within an industry.80 This is particu-
larly true where there is no general agreement for non-deceptive use of
particular descriptive terms in marking or advertising a product, or where
firms are forced to use illegal practices because of competitive pressure from
Apparently such settlements were not permitted before a Federal Trade Commission
Order of June 29, 1949, cited in GELLER, ADvm TnSING AT T lE CROSSROADS 168 (1952).
Almost all violations of the Wool Labeling Act halted by the Commission were corrected
without formal prosecution. FTC ANN. REP. 57-9 (1952). Compliance was affected ad-
ministratively in 14,696 cases of labeling deficiencies spotted by the Commission. Id. at 57,
30. FTC ANN. REP. 74 (1952).
31. 16 FED. REG. 6503-4 (1951).
32. FTC Rules of Practice, Rule 5(1), 16 FED. REG. 6504 (1951).
33. FTC ANN. REP. 74 (1952). However, their violation does not bring comparable fines.
34. 16 FED. REG. 6503, 6504 (1951). Prior to this date, admissions of violations were
required in stipulations. Sections 5(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT.
239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(b) (1946), was designed to force the Commission to drop
the requirement. DAvis, ADmiNsRATivE LAw 155 (1951).
35. FTC Rules of Practice, Rule 5(c), 16 FED. REG. 6503 (1951).
36. The Commission disposed of 182 cases under the stipulation procedure in the last
fiscal year, FTC ANN. RP. 74 (1952), and issued cease and desist orders against 108
firms involved in unfair and deceptive acts and practices. Id. at 41. Yet during the same
period its own investigators or complaints from outside sources reported many thousands
of violations, most of which were apparently not investigated. Id. at 51. Commissioner
Mason has often denounced, as a type of discrimination, the Commission's use of selective
prosecution, since parties not prosecuted-the large majority of offenders-are given great
financial, social and competitive advantages over those selected for prosecution. See
Address of Commissioner Mason before the Dayton Advertising Club, Nov. 6, 1947, copy
in Yale Law Library; and speeches cited note 129 infra. Widespread use of a practice
by'a respondent's competitors, however, affords no defense to a cease and desist order.
International Art Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 109 F2d 393, 397 (7th Cir.), ccrt.
denied, 310 U.S. 632 (1940). Isolated prosecution of a few among many users of a con-
demned practice does not constitute prejudicial discrimination. National Candy Company




similar violations by other firms.3r In either situation, individual firms are
most reluctant to accept a stipulation agreement which would require them
to cease common practices if their competitors are not required to cease at
the same time.3 s Similarly, they are unwilling to make affirmative disclosures
about their product if it would put them at a competitive disadvantage with
competing products about which no similar disclosures were to be made.39
And if the Bureau of Antideceptive Practices should succeed in obtaining cease
and desist orders against a representative offender, it would result only in
putting that firm at a competitive disadvantage without effectively abating the
general use of the injurious practices.40 To deal with such situations on an
industry-wide basis, the FTC has developed its Trade Practice Conference
Program, under its Bureau of Industry Cooperation.4 1
Under the Trade Conference Program the Commission conducts a series of
informal and formal conferences culminating in formulation of a set of rules
for industry behavior. The Commission seeks industry-wide agreement to
drop unfair competitive practices common in the industry and urges adoption
of appropriate standards for non-deceptive descriptions and labeling of in-
dustry products.4 The trade conference rules, in theory, do not create new
law,43 but are issued to provide definitive guidance and information for busi-
nessmen as to what the Commission believes is required by the laws the Com-
mission enforces.4 The FTC has no specific statutory authority for issuance
37. See GAs.T. 106 et seq. (1936); Thompson, Highlights in the Ev 'ltion of t:e
Federal Trade Comnission, 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 257, 2Mi-9 (1940).
38. GAsma. 106 (1936).
39. See note 37 supra.
40. See note 36 supra, and public addresses of Commissioner Mason, cited note 12)
infra.
41. FTC ANN. REP. 2 (1947). For representative discussions, see .Mna ,r U:;.nr
ComPEnrIoN 281, 406 (1941); Cohen, FTC's Trade Practice Program Reflects X\cu
Idusrial Attitude, Ind. Marketing, Jan. 19, 1947, p. 32; Nichols, FTC and Brusiness Can
Be Friends Under Trade Practice Plan, Printer's Ink, Sept. 27, 1946, p. 44. While the
Commission is currently emphasizing the Conference Program, the first FTC-industry
conference was held as early as 1918 to cope with deceptive marking by manufacturers
of gold rings. The Commission had received a multitude of complaints that plated rings
were being sold as solid gold or that the gold content of rings was misreprezented. But
since these deceptive practices had not yet been forbidden by statute or decisional lawv,
the FTC could only prosecute on grounds of unfair competition. Proof was difficult, how-
ever, because such terms as "gold-shell," "gold-plated," and "gold-filled" had no accepted
meaning within the industry itself. Vith the cooperation of leading ring manufacturers
a conference was called and fair practices of marking gold content agreed upon. These
standards, known as a "Trade Practice Submittal," were vdely circulated and wyere ued
by the Commission as a basis for cease and desist orders. Soon after the ring conference,
similar conferences were held in the creamery and in the book and vwiting-paper indus-
tries. GAsKn. 108 et seq.
42. FTC ANN. RE'. 61 (1952).
43. 4 CALLmANN, UNFAIR Co.PEnrrrION Am TRADE MAns 2036 (2d ed. 1950)
(hereinafter cited as CAI.LmANN).
44. FTC ANN. REP. 63 (1952).
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of the rules, but relies instead on the early legislative history of the FTC
Act 45 and on subsequent congressional appropriations made explicitly for
the drafting and administration of the rules.40
Antitrust Violations
Formal complaint and enforcement procedures available to cope with the
antitrust violations are similar to procedures used for deceptive practices and
unfair competition cases. Since the Federal Trade Commission Act's ban
upon unfair competition has been interpreted to encompass Sherman Act
violations,47 formal procedures for attacking these violations are in fact
identical with unfair competition and deceptive practice procedures. However,
more cumbersome procedures are utilized to restrain Clayton and Robinson-
Patman Act violations. Under Clayton and Robinson-Patman, the Commis-
sion cannot seek a fine when its order is violated, but must then obtain a court
order prohibiting the practice. Punitive sanctions are brought into operation
only when the subsequent court order is violated.4 8 The necessity of the sub-
sequent order complicates enforcement headaches. FTC antitrust proceedings
raise problems similar to those raised in deceptive practice and unfair coni-
petition proceedings: a small enforcement agency is faced with a huge en-
forcement task ;49 litigation is lengthy and may involve considerable delay ;50
45. See, e.g., Address of James A. Horton, Director, FTC Bureau of Industry Co-
operation, before Chemical Soil Conditioner Industry, Nov. 10, 1952, copy in Yale Law
Library (stressing the "Wilsonian concept" of giving industry advice and definite guld-
ance on legal matters). The legality of the rules is now unquestionable. See H.R. No.
3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1951).
46. See, e.g., FTC TRANscRiPt, HEAoNGs ON THIRD DEFIcENCy ArI'ROIIuArIoN BILL
FOR 1946 (June 7, 1946), copy in Yale Law Library.
47. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 463
(1941) ; Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
48. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1946). Originally, FTC
orders under the FTC Act were enforced similarly, see 38 STAT. 720 (1914), but this wag
altered by the Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 STAT. 112 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (Supp.
1952). The Commission has twice recommended that the Clayton Act be amended in the same
way because of the cumbersome enforcement procedure. FTC ANN. REr. 3 (1952); id.
at 7 (1951). See Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 478-80 (1952).
49. In the FTC as well as the Justice Department, proceedings against major re-
straints of competition are deferred for lack of manpower. EDwARDs, MAINTAINING
ComPEnToI 298 (1951). The number of complaints received by the Bureau of Anti-
monopoly is not published. One estimate holds that the Bureau takes enforcement action
against less than 1% of the Robinson-Patman violations reported to it. INTERV ws (an
Editor of this JOURNAL interviewed a large number of FTC personnel, including Bureau
Directors, Division and Unit chiefs, and staff lawyers in April and November, 1952, in
connection with the preparation of this Comment; much of the information thus obtained
was "not for attribution" or "off the record;" these sources will be cited as in this
instance as INTamviEws). Even when a case is investigated, the Bureau apparently neither
closes nor dismisses the case, nor issues a formal complaint following 90% of the investi-
gations. FTC ANN. REP. 27 (1952).
50. FTC Ann. REP. 8 (1951); see note 22 supra.
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and many defendants seem to be willing voluntarily to bring their practices
into conformity with FTC interpetations.!1
In the antitrust field, however, the Commission has been reluctant to deviate
from its formal complaint proceedings. Insofar as Sherman Act violations are
concerned, the Commission apparently believes that clear collusive restraints
of trade are entered into with kmowledge of their illegality and without any
acceptable justification, and should thus be formally enjoined to prevent pos-
sible recurrence of the violation.52 Additionally, as a matter of policy, the
Commission may refrain from settling such cases informally in order to pre-
vent embarrassment of private or Justice Department litigation which might
be brought on the same facts.53 'Where Clayton and Robinson-Patman viola-
tions are under investigation, informal settlements have been stymied also by
the Commission's interpretations of its enforcement mandate. The latter Acts
provide that the Commission "shall issue and serve a complaint" upon any
person which it has reason to believe is violating the Acts.rA On the other
hand, the Federal Trade Commission Act-passed concurrently with Clayton
-proxides that the Commission should issue complaints "if in the interest of
the public."' 5 From the discrepancy in wording the Commission has con-
cluded, until recently at least, that formal prosecution is mandatory in all
Clayton and Robinson-Patman cases.?0 Thus, even when the respondent is
willing to drop a practice before a complaint issues, the FTC continues litiga-
tion until the abandoned practice has been officially enjoined. 7
Because of the Commission's attitude toiward informal settlement of anti-
trust cases, the Trade Practice Program was not developed in response to
51. See concurring opinion of Commissioner Mason, Gruen Watch Company, FTC
Dock. No. 5836 (March 17, 1952). This is true primarily of Robinson-Patman viola-
tions, not Sherman Act cases. In the latter, strong resistance by corporate defendants is
common, and factual and policy problems complem. EnwAr, x's, MINTn;TaIN COMPL-rl-
TIo-T 287 et seq. (1951).
52. Statement of Policy, FTC Axx. RrP. 138 (1951).
53. Ibid.
54. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1946) (emphasis supplied).
55. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(6) (1946). Congressional supporters of
the FTC seemed to believe that fraudulent practices belonged in an altogether different
category from the predatory practices of the "trusts," the prime evil sought to ba cur-
tailed. Thus Congress sought to guard against the Commission becoming so involved
with control of common-law commercial frauds that its limited personnel would L2
diverted from the primary monopoly control task by inserting the provision that fraudu-
lent practices should be prosecuted "if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding
by it -ill be in the interest of the public." Rublee, Original Plan and Early History of
the Federal Trade Commission, 11 Acan PoL. SCL Pnoc. 117-13 (1926).
56. FTC A x. REP. 137, 139 (1951). But ef. text at notes 157-66 infra.
57. Address of Commissioner Mason before Section on Antitrust Law of the New
York State Bar Association, February 19, 1953, copy in Yale Law Library. See, e.g.,
Deer v. Federal Trade Commission, 152 F2d 65 (2d Cir. 1945); Educators Ass'n v.
Federal Trade Commission, 108 F2d 470 (2d Cir. 1939), smodificd, 118 F2d 562 (2d Cir.
1941). See also Note, 53 HArv. L. REv. 628, 634-7 (1940).
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the need of providing more efficient techniques of administering antitrust laws.
Rather, the origins of the program lie primarily in the deceptive practice
field. 58 And while most trade rules do contain provisions forbidding viola-
tions of the antitrust laws, these antitrust rules are usually verbatim restate-
ments of the antitrust acts and are included merely for educational effect.60 Re-
cently, however, the Commission has taken steps which indicate that considerable
use may be made of the Trade Practice Conference Program to curtail
industry-wide violations of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Act prohibits any
discrimination in price or services which may injure competition amnong
sellers, buyers, or the customers of either.60 Court interpretations of Robin-
son-Patman's confused provisions made the status of the law unintelligible
in many situations.6 ' The story of FTC action in the cosmetics industry aptly
illustrates how factors similar to those present in the deceptive practice field
are apparently influencing a shift to the trade conference procedure, at least
in the Robinson-Patman portion of the antitrust domain.
The cosmetics industry had been in extended litigation with the Commission
over manufacturers' payment of salaries of "demonstrators," i.e., clerks who
demonstrate and sell the product in large department stores and specialty
shops.62 The Bureau of Antimonopoly's lawyers had long contended that the
Act's requirement that services furnished to buyers be "on proportionally equal
terms" meant that cosmetics manufacturers must, contrary to their estab-
lished practice, 63 furnish the same service to all customers-including the
corner drug store-or to none at all.6 4 In Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Federal
58. See note 41 Yupra.
59.. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Allen C. Phelps, Chief, Div. of
Trade Practice Conf., FTC, dated May 29, 1952, in Yale Law Library. For typical anti-
trust rules see note 111 infra. The inclusion of verbatim repetitions of the statutory
language has been criticised as a "completely meaningless gesture." Well, F.T.C.'s In-
dustry Rides: How Do They Affect You?, Printer's Ink, Sept. 2, 1949, pp. 42, 48.
60. The Robinson-Patman Amendment of § 2 of the Clayton Act made it unlawful for a
seller to discriminate in price between purchasers where the effect may be to lessen sub-
stantially competition (§ 2(a)); or to pay a customer for any services or facilities
furnished by the customer in connection with the sale, etc., of any products unless such
payment is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in
the distribution of such products (§ 2(d)); or to discriminate in favor of one pur-
chaser against another by furnishing services or facilities connected with the sale, etc.,
of the goods upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms
(§ 2(e)). 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (d), and (e) (1946).
61. See Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 972 (1951), and cases cited therein.
62. In the years 1936-1937 and again in 1940, the Commission issued seven con-
plaints against manufacturers of cosmetic products, alleging, in general, that these manu-
facturers had furnished the services of "demonstrators" to large department stores and
had not furnished proportionate like services to other purchasers. 3 CCH TRADE RE .
REP. 20,625 (1951)
63. See note 67 infra. See Statement by Commissioner Ayres in opposition to
promulgation of the Cosmetics Industry Rules. 3 CCH TRADE REG. RE,. 20,628 (1951).
64. Id. at 20,628-9.
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Trade Comrn ssion,65 and in a subsequent private action, Elifabclh Arden
Sales Corporation v. Gus Blass Co., 6 this position was seemingly upheld.
A subsequent industry investigation by the FTC revealed that a substantial
number of the industry's two hundred-odd manufacturers were engaged in
similar practices. 7 Presumably, competitive pressure from those persisting
in "illegal" practices forced others to behave in like manner. Industry-wide
case by case enforcement by the small staff was manifestly impossible; selec-
tive prosecution would have been unfair. Forced to attempt industry-Wide
action, the Commission on its own motion called a conference,-3 probably
under the urging of the few firms being formally prosecuted a for practices
indulged in by the entire industry. As a result of the conference negotiations,
industry members and the Commission arrived at a specific cude of behavior
governing permissible use of "demonstrators." 70  Currently, Commission
action elsewhere also indicates that other Robinson-Patman trouble spots will
be attacked via trade practice conferences. 7'
THE TRADE PRACTICE CONFERENCE PROGRM
The Conference
Requests for a conference may originate with either the FTC staff or in-
dustry and consumer groups.7 2 Typically, however, the impetus comes from
industry members. 73 Sometimes there is disagreement within the industry
as to proper standards of marking and branding, sale methods, or terminology
65. 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), ccrt. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947).
66. 150 F.2d 9S3 (8th Cir. 1945).
67. I.--'rvmws. The investigation was apparently begun shortly after the Arden case
was affirmed in the court of appeals in 1946. See FTC Az:. Rvra. 3 (1947).
68. See FTC ANN. RFP. 3 (1947) ; 3 CCH Th.-,iE REG. REr. ff 20, 618 (1951).
69. Upon the successful completion of the Arden test ease, the Commission apparently
planned to press charges against other cosmetics firms on the six complaints issued 9
years previously. I.-"Rvimvs. 3 CCH TnaaE Rr,. REP. 20, 625 (1951). The nctions
against these firms were finally dropped more than five years after the first cosmvtics
trade practice conference was held. See note 166 infra.
70. For Cosmetics Industry Rules, see notes 116 infra. For general discus- iun of the
rules, see Setting the Standards for Cosmetics and Toilet Goods Industry, Chein. ,Vcel:
Dec. 15, 1951, pp. 41-2. For an early proposed draft of these rules, see OFrz::nra.
U N FAm TL..nz PiLcrIcEs 1218 (1950).
71. See note 122 infra.
72. Prior to 1946, conferences were generally called only upon petitiLn of the industry,
FTC ANN. REP 3 (1947) ; FTC TRA.zNscriur, HrxnINGS oN Tutn DEric:L 'c Arpr,%U-
roiATiwN Bn.t. Foa 1946, p. 8 (June 7, 1946), copy in Yale Law Library. Following a re-
organization plan put into effect on August 12, 1946, the Commission adopted a policy of
initiating conferences on its own motion. FTC Rules of Practice, Rule 28(b), 1 Coe.4
Fio. REcs. § 2.28(b) (1949), FTC AxN. REP. 114 (1947).
73. Since 1946, the Commission has published rules for 36 additional industries. In
only seven were the proceedings instituted on the Commission's own motion. 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. ff 20,252-87 (1946-52).
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which cannot be resolved through an appropriate trade association."4 At other
times conference requests apparently come from firms confronted with selec-
tive FTC individual prosecution for use of industry-wide practices," or from
firms injured by a rival's false -advertising or deceptive practices which they
are unable to stop by private actions."° But whatever the source, conference
requests are studied by the Conference Division, and if the situation is of
sufficient importance and personnel are available, it will recommend that the
Commission grant the request. 71
Planning a projected conference centers in the Rule-Making Unit of the
Conference Division. Initially, Division attorneys check the files at both FTC
enforcement arms, the Bureau of Antideceptive Practices and the Bureau of
Antimonopoly, for information on every type of illegal practice in the industry
that the Commission has noted.78 To curtail risks that the conference program
might be used to further industry trends towards illegal collusion or coni-
bination, the Conference Division requests informal clearance for the confer-
74. INTERvIEws. Lack of enforcement power has generally prevented effective trade
association action to prevent deceptive practices. SUARP & Fox, BusINEss EThiCS 251
(1937). See also 14 ENCycZ Soc. Sci. 671, 674 (1933). Cooperative industry-FTC
efforts in rule making often resulted in solutions of such problems. Communication to
the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Paul M. Cameron, Ass't Chief, Div. of Trade Practice
Conf., FTC, dated Feb. 25, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
75. ImNTEvi'ws. The FTC seeks to guard, however, against use of conferences and
informal settlements "as an easy escape for willful violators of the laws administered
by the Commission." FTC ANN. REP. 138 (1951).
76. A right of action has long existed to restrain ofie businessman from "passing off"
his goods as those of another by use of any technique through which the goods of one
party to the suit will probably be accepted by the purchasing party as the goods of an-
other. 1 CALLmAN 40, 71 et seq.; 3 id. at 1628 et seq. But these suits can be predicated only
on the theory of passing off or on such other wrongful acts as are within the law of
torts--e.g., trespass upon property, inducement to breach of contract, libel and slander,
fraud, etc. See, e.g., Everett Piano Co. v. Maus, 200 Fed. 719 (6th Cir, 1912) ; Katz v.
Kapper, 7 Cal. App2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935) ; Note, 9 So. CALIF. L, 1'azv. 425 (1936).
False or misleading advertising as such can not be enjoined. American Washboard Co,
v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281, (6th Cir. 1900). For the few exceptions to this
general rule, see Callman, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 COL. L. Ra. 876,
878, 880 (1948). Generally, absent special legislation or evidence of disparagement, or
an attempt to drive a competitor out of business, it is impossible to succeed in an action
against one's competitors for false advertising. Id. at 878; 1 CALLMANN 300.
77. Personnel limitations require the Commission to defer a large portion of industry
conference requests. "Dozens and dozens" of such requests were being deferred in 1946,
FTC TRANSCRIPT, HEARINGS ON THIRD DEFICIENCY APPROPRIATION BILL FoR 1940,
p. 15 (June 7, 1946), copy in Yale Law Library. The number of current applications is
not made public, but apparently the backlog is larger than in 1946. Communication to the
YALE LAW JOURNAL from James A. Horton, Director, Bureau of Industry Cooperation,
FTC, dated March 5, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
78. Communication to the Yale Law Journal from Allen C. Phelps, Chief, Div. of
Trade Practice Conf., FTC, dated May 29, 1952, in Yale Law Library.
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ence from the Justice Department and all appropriate divisions of the FTC.
If further field investigation is required, it is conducted by the Conference
Division in conjunction with committees from the industry seeking the con-
ference."" And if distinctive rules are needed to clarify conditions for use of
descriptive terminology, the FTC depends in large measure for advice and
research assistance freely given by industry or Government agencies-primarily
research assistance freely given by the industry or Government agencies-
primarily the Bureau of Standards.8 '
After assembling all available information, Conference Division lawyers
prepare a tentative draft of industry rules, often with the substantial aid of
an industry committee.8 2 These rules attempt to cover all illegal competitive
practices uncovered in the preliminary investigation, and offer whatever
affirmative standards are thought to be necessary as a guide to their correc-
tion.s 3 In cases where the practice is common in many industries, the rule
provision is lifted verbatim from the previous codes.84 Serious difficulties are
often encountered, however, in the drafting of the "custom-made" rules, i.e.,
detailed provisions applicable to one industry alone.8s
After a draft of suggested rules has been completed, all members of the
affected industry are invited to a conference.8 0 Here the proposed draft is
circulated, and representatives of the Commission explain their views as to
79. INTzrvirs. The FTC's Bureau of Antimonopoly apparently passes up no oppr-
tunity to object to conferences. In at least one case a conference %vas oppved un a
basis of a complaint received by the Bureau three decades before. I:nvn& '. s.
80. IxTERvImws.
81. Ibid. Bureau of Standards research assistance as an aid to Commission evalua-
tion of deceptive claims has recently been the subject of sharp political controversy. N.Y.
Times, April 12, 1953, § E, p. 7.
82. Occasionally, the first tentative draft to be discussed at the cnference may L:
prepared by an industry committee alone. See, e.g., Proposed Trade Practice Rules ior
the Smoking Pipe Industry (1952), copy in Yale La, Library, which served as the
basis for discussions of the conference of that industry held in New Yorlh City, Oct 12r,
1952.
83. Communication from Allen C. Phelps, note 78 supra; Communication irom Paul
M. Cameron, note 74 supra.
84. While the phrasing of these standard provisions has ben varied and molified
over a period of years, the substance of early rules is contained in the "boiler plate" pru-
visions of recent rules. Compare, e.g., 3 CCH TL DE RIG. REP. 1 20,189 (1935), tdth id.
20, 267 (1950) (all 14 provisions of Fire Extinguisher Appliance Manufacturing In-
dustry Rules, promulgated Nov. 13, 1935, repeated without substantial change in Candy
Industry Rules, promulgated Jan. 18, 1950). For example of expansion of originally
simple "boiler plate" provision into elaborate rules, compare early form of decptive guarati-
tee provision in Putty 'Manufacturing Industry Rules, Rule 12, id. l 20 ,223 (1939), With
detailed provisions in Piston Ring Industry Rules, Rule 8, id. rT 20,250 (1940).
85. I ,-umvlws.
86. The Conference Division seeks to obtain from trade associations and other Gov-
ernment agencies all available lists of industry members in order to give individual
notice to firms before conferences and public hearings commence. Irxmzvzws. For the
results of failure to give full notice to all members, although numbering several thouwand,
of an industry covered by rules, see discussion of Rules for Oil Heating Industry, New
England States, note 172 infra.
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what conduct is required by law.8 7 The ensuing discussions from the floor
often turn up aspects of the industry's competitive conditions either not con-
sidered or given insufficient weight in the initial investigations.8" Meritorious
suggestions for changes or modifications in the tentative draft may be offered
by participating businessmen. Following the conference, staff attorneys study
these suggestions and prepare another draft.89 Usually only one industry con-
ference is necessary, but in industries with complex problems or in which
there is considerable opposition to the rules, as many as three conferences
have been held in order to improve provisions and promote industry accept-
ance of the final rules.90
When the proposed rules take final form, they are submitted to the Com-
mission for preliminary approval.9 ' At this point the Commission holds a
public hearing to which both industry members and representatives of con-
sumer groups are invited. 2 Following this hearing, provided no need is
shown for substantial modifications, the Commission officially approves the
rules 0 3 and copies are mailed to all industry members listed in FTC indexes
and directories. 4
87. Observations by an Editor of this JOURNAL during Trade Practice Conferences,
Smoking Pipe Industry, October, 1952.
88. INTERVIEWS.
89. INTERVIEWs; FTC ANN. REP. 68 (1951).
90. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Lowell B. Mason, Conmnis-
sioner, FTC, dated October 29, 1952, in Yale Law Library. In preparing revised rules
for the radio-television industry, the Commission held three formal conferences and many
informal conferences. FTC ANN. REP. 68 (1952) ; id. at 75 (1951).
91. See note 93 infra.
92. Attendance at these hearings, as well as at conferences, is subject to marked
variations, even where similar groups are involved. E.g., hearings on latest revision of
Rayon and Acetate Textile Industry Rules, 3 CCH TRADE REa. REP. II 20,206 (1951),
published December 11, 1951, were well attended by industry members, along with repre-
sentatives of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, the New York State Federation
of Women's Clubs, Consumers Research, Consumers Union, Teachers of Home Eco-
nomics, representatives of household magazines, and individual housewives. FTC ANN.
REP. 65 (1952). In contrast, see FTC Holds Trade Practice Hearings on Rih's
for Rayon, Arylon and Silk Converting Trade, Rayon, Nov. 1948, pp. 44, 46 (very strin-
gent industry rules, but only small portion of trade present, and little discussion of pro-
posed rules). See 3 CCH Ta.DE REG. REP. 11 20,261 (1949).
93. The Commissioners review rules for an industry at two stages of the proceedings.
After the conference is held the Commission reviews the proposed draft and suggests
changes prior to the submission of a tentative draft at a public hearing. The draft is
again reviewed by the Commission after the public hearing and in the light of all informa-
tion submitted during the entire proceeding. At this second review the Commission
approves the rules for final promulgation. See Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL
from Allen C. Phelps, Chief, Div. of Trade Practice Conf., FTC, dated May 29, 1952,
in Yale Law Library.
94. FTC Rules of Practice, Rule 33(g), 16 CoDE FED. REGs. § 2.33(g) (1949) ; FTC
ANN. REP. 131 (1951). Upon promulgation of the rules, they are usually printed in
full in the trade journals of the industries affected, with little comment other than brief
words of approval. See, e.g., Household Dye Trade Rides Issued, Oil Paint & Drug Rep.,
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The trade rules usually cover, at least in general terms, all practices likely
to be troublesome in the industry for many years following promulgation.
However, certain "custom-made" rules, especially those dealing with adver-
tising, may become quickly outdated. Advertising specialists are constantly
devising new claims or promotional techniques, and research staffs create un-
forseen improvements in products.95 Competititve pressure in either event
often leads to questionable advertising not covered by rules. As a result,
the Trade Practice Conference Division is apparently trying to develop an
informal auxiliary conference teclmique-without fanfare, public hearing, and
full conference dressing-to keep its advertisement rules up-to-date.00 The
first experiment along these lines is an effort to put appropriate boundaries
around industry-wide lipstick advertising that claims a product is "indelible,"
"long-lasting" and "non-smear."9 7  If successful in curbing unwarranted
claims in this area, the Commission may use the same technique to govern
claims about the effectiveness of chlorophyll content in other cosmetics in-
dustry products,98 and comparable trouble spots in other industries.
The final rules are officially divided into tvo categories. Rules in Group II
merely codify practices which the industry recommends as a matter of busi-
ness ethics or trade improvement, but which are not required by law. 9 These
rules, very general in terms, resemble a "Boy Scout" code and are of little
significance except for slight educational effect. 100 Group I rules, on the other
Feb. 3, 1947, p. 5; Credit Je-welers Adopt Fair Trade Practice Rides, Printer's Ink,
June 28, 1946, p. 5; Here is Full Text of New Rules for Rayon and Acetate, Rayon,
Jan. 1952, p. 44; FTC Trade Practice Conference on Watcr-Resistant Fabrics and Ap-
parel, Rayon, Sept. 1948, p. 65; Trade Practice Rules and Test Procedures for Textiles,
38 Aim. DYESTuFF REP. 274 (1949). For trade journal reports with severe criticism,
see note 172 infra.
95. See GELuE, ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS 67 et seq. (1952).
96. Food, Drug & Cosmetics Reports P-2, August 16, 1952.
97. See 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP'. 12,413 (1953).
98. Ibid.
99. The Commission will not promulgate rules of this type unless the provisions are
"in harmony with law and the public interest and are constructively in support of the
maintenance of fair. competitive conditions in the industry." FTC Axr. REP. 63 (1952).
100. Group II rules usually consist of provisions stating, e.g.: "Contracts ... are
business obligations which should be performed in letter and spirit" 3 CCH TRADE RE(.
RPi. 1 20,252, Rule B (1948). "The industry approves the practice of handling business
disputes between members of the industry and their customers in a fair and reasonable
manner ... f, and if no composition of differences results, of submitting] these disputes to
arbitration!' Id. ff 20,256, Rule B (1947). Insofar as lawful, the industry and the FTC
approve of distribution among members of the industry of credit information. Id. U
20,262, Rule D (1949). Others are more similar to some Group I rules. E.g., industry
recommendation that peat products with high moisture absorbing qualities he sold on a
dry measure basis, rather than by weight. Id. if 20,266, Rule A (1950). A few make
recommendations to promote "open competition," such as independent publication and
circulation, by each competitor, of his price lists and terms of sale among the purchasing
trade. Id. 1 20,267, Rule D (1950). A few industry rules contain Group II provisions
recommending the compilation and distribution of industry statistics to the extent legally
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hand, are those -provisions which the Commission feels express the require-
ments of federal law. 10 ' This group contains both the "custom-made" and
"boiler plate" industry rules. Group I rules may be divided into two general
areas: those concerning deceptive practices and unfair competitive practices;
and rules dealing with antitrust violations.
Modern rules dealing with deceptive practices and unfair competition range
from highly generalized to highly particularized specifications for business
behavior. A large portion of the trade rules now in force consist of standard
provisions cataloging practices which have long been held illegal under the
statutes enforced by the Commission.' 0 2 These "boiler plate" provisions, re-
peated verbatim in code after code, deal largely with such unfair methods of
competition as commercial bribery,10 3 disparagement of competitors' pro-
ducts, 10 4 circulation of false or misleading price lists and price tags,10 use of
permitted under antitrust decisions. Id. If 20,267, Rule B (1950). Group II rules have
been the target of much criticism as innocuous expressions of platitudes and their complete
elimination has been recommended. OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRAcarIcEs 768 (1950).
But considerable significance is attached to Group 11 rules as developing fair stanldards
which may eventually be required by law in Kittle & Mostow, A Review of the Trade
Practice Conferences of the Federal Trade Commission, 8 Gwe. WAsH. L. REV. 427, 450-1
(1940).
101. Group I rules, according to the Commission, "embrace trade practices con-
sidered illegal under laws administered by the Commission and the Courts. . . .Adher-
ence to [Rule] ... requirements is mandatory upon all, quite irrespective of the fact that
some industry members may have refused to take part in the establishment of rules or
refused or failed to pledge obedience thereto." FTC ANN. REP. 63 (1952). For repre-
sentative Group I rules, see notes 103-7, 109-13 infra.
102. The standard provisions summarize court decisions in language reasonably
understandable to executives who operate the day to day affairs of business. Cohen,
FTC Sponsors Industrial Competition, Self-Regiation, Indust. Marketing, March, 1946,
p. 66.
103. Forty-six of the 60 industry codes promulgated since 1940 contain commercial
bribery "boiler plate" provisions. E.g., Bedding Manufacturing and Wholesale Distribut-
ing Industry, Rule II, 3 CCH TRADE REG. RE'. ff 20,276 (1950); "It is an unfair trade
practice for a member of the industry, directly or indirectly, to give, or offer to give,
or permit or cause to be given, money or anything of value to agents, employees, or
representatives of customers or prospective customers, without the knowledge of their
employers or principals; to purchase or contract to purchase bedding products manu-
factured or sold by such industry member or the maker of such gift or offer, or to
influence such employers or principals to refrain from dealing or contracting to deal with
competitors."
104. Forty-nine of the 60 industry codes promulgated since 1940 have contained a
provision similar to the following: "The defamation of competitors by falsely imputing
to them dishonorable conduct, inability to perform contracts, questionable credit standing,
or by other false representations, or the false disparagement of the grade, quality, quan-
tity, substance, character, nature, origin, size, or preparation of any product of com-
petitors, or of their business methods, selling prices, values, credit terms, policies, or
services, is an unfair trade practice." Yeast Industry, Rule 10, 3 CCH TRADE Rrd. RrA,.
ff 20,263 (1949).
105. "(a) The publishing or circulating ... of false or misleading price quotations,
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lottery schemes in retail distribution,' 6 and many other common forms of
unfair or deceptive practices.10 7 The meat of the rules, however, is contained
in "custom-made" provisions patterned to control practices in a particular in-
dustrylOs Such provisions may be directed at advertising and !Eales methods,
for example, by requiring that a product be of a particular type or meet cer-
tain requirements to justify use of a manufacturer's claims or use of certain
designations. The detailed scope of conduct comprehended by the "custom-
made" provisions is aptly exemplified in the recent set of rules adopted for
the pearl industry. The Pearl Industry Rules contain extensive provisions
governing the use of such terms as "genuine," "natural," "Natura," "wild,"
price lists, terms or conditions of sale, or reports as to production or sales, with the
capacity, tendency or effect of misleading or deceiving purchasers ... or offering i r
sale of industry products ... at purported reductions in prices when such purla.rtcd re-
ductions are in fact fictitious or are otherwise misleading or deceptive, is an unfair trade
practice.
"(b) It is an unfair trade practice . . . [in] offering for sale, industry prolucts at
[purported reductions in price] . . .or to furnish or supply for such use ... price tag;,
labels, or advertising material that set forth a false, fictitious, or exaggerated current,
former, or regular price, or a false, fictitious, or exaggerated manufacturer's or distribu-
tor's suggested retail selling price... It is likewise an unfair trade practice t") distrhLutL..
products bearing such false, fictitious, or exaggerated price tags or labels." Pearl h1'rlu-try,
Rule 13, 3 CCH TrAkDE REG. REP. 20,285 (1952).
106. Nineteen of the 60 codes promulgated since 1940 have contained such provisions.
See, e.g., Wholesale Confectionery Industry, Rule 6,3 CCH Tr-trE Ri,3. REP. c 20252 ( 1943 s.
107. See Office Machine Marketing Industry, Rules, 3 CCH T1rz RE,. Rn . c 20,25
(1948), banning false invoicing, substitution of products, misreprecentation of proluct
as conforming to a particular standard, tie-in sales, deceptive guarantees, and wisrepre-
sentation as to installment sales contracts; Cocoa & Chocolate Industry, Ruks, id.
fJ 20,275 (1950), banning misuse of the word "free," promoting monopuly by -Lling
below cost; Floor Machinery Industry, Rules, id. f 20236 (1952), banning deception
in regard to new or rebuilt products and misrepresentation as to earnings of salesmen;
Wholesale Confectionary Industry, Rules, id. 1 20,252 (1943), banning use of bait adver-
tising (small quantity of goods priced at unusually low price to draw cu.tomers), anJ
containing a very common provision requiring that a clear differentiation b. made be-
tween wholesale and retail transactions where carried on at the same establishmeat.
Common "deceptive practice" rules, exemplified by those in the Pearl Industry Rules,
are bans on consignment distribution without the express request of the purchaser,
false advertisement of "close-out" sales, "discontinued lines,' or "special bargains,' mis-
representation of functional nature of business (producer, manufacturer, importer). Id.
ff 20,285 (1952). Typical provisions banning traditional types of unfair competition are
those found in the Floor Machine Industry Rules which ban unfair threats of infringe-
ment suits, inducing breach of contract, enticing away employees of competitors, Eccuring
competitors' confidential information by unfair means, defamation of competitors and
false disparagement of their products. Id. t 20,2S6 (1952).
108. A few rules are composed exclusively of "custom-made" rules. See, e.g., Tuna
Industry, Rules, 3 CCH T.DkE REG. REP. 11 20,229 (1945); Watch & Watch Case In-
dustry, Rules, id. 1 20,2953 (1947) ; Mail Order Insurance Industry, Rules, id. ' 20,2(3
(1950) ; Installment Sales and Financing of Motor Vehicles, Rules, id. 'J 20,173 (1951).
See Note, Protection of Autonobile Installment Buyers: The FTC Steps In, 61 Y.uVu
LJ. 718 (1952).
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"cultured," "Kultured," "synthetic," "replica," and "reproduction" in the sale
of pearls.10 9 Specific types of advertising, such as illustrations deceptively
indicating the size of the pearls offered for sale, or deceptive use of pictures
of oysters, deep sea divers, etc., in advertisements of imitation pearls are pro-
hibited by the rules."10
109. "It is an unfair trade practice to use the unqualified word 'pearl,' or any other
word or phrase of like meaning or connotation, to describe, identify, or refer to any
object or product which is not in fact a pearl as defined in § 208.0.
"It is an unfair trade practice to use the word 'pearl' to describe, identify, or refer to
a cultured pearl unless it is immediately preceded, with equal conspicuity, by the word
'cultured' or 'cultivated,' or by some other word or phrase of like meaning and coinnota-
tion, so as to indicate definitely and clearly that the product is not a pearl.
"It is an unfair trade practice to use the word 'pearl' to describe, identify, or refer to
an imitation pearl unless it is immediately preceded, with equal conspicuity, by the word
'imitation' or 'simulated' or by some other word or phrase of like meaning and connota-
tion, so as to indicate definitely and clearly that the product is not a pearl. Note: Tile
placing of an asterisk next to the word 'pearl,' which asterisk makes reference to a foot-
note explanation of the fact that the product is an imitation or cultured pearl, is not
regarded as compliance with the requirements of this section." Pearl Industry, Rule 2,
3 CCII TRADE Rm. RmE. 20,285 (1952).
"It is an unfair trade practice to use the word 'reproduction' or 'replica' as descriptive
of cultured or imitation pearls.
"It is an unfair trade practice to use the term 'synthetic' as descriptive of an imita-
tion or cultured pearl, or of any other product unless such other product has been arti-
ficially created and is of similar appearance and of essentially the same physical and
chemical structure as a pearl. Note: Synthetic pearls possessing the same structure,
properties, and characteristics as natural pearls have not yet been produced." id. Rule 4.
"It is an unfair trade practice to use the word 'real,' 'genuine,' 'natural,' or 'wild,'
or any other word, expression, or representation of similar import, in any way as descrip-
tive of any article or articles which are manufactured or produced synthetically or arti-
ficially, or which are artificially cultured or cultivated, or which are a simulation or
imitation of or substitute for pearls, with the tendency and capacity or effect of misleading
or deceiving purchasers, prospective purchasers, or the consuming public." Id. Rule 5.
"Examples of deceptive simulations within the inhibitions of paragraph (b) of the
section are (1) 'Natura,' when used as descriptive of a culture or imitation pearl, and
(2) 'Kultured,' when used as descriptive of an imitation pearl." Id. Rule 7n.
110. "It is an unfair trade practice, in connection with the offering for sale, sale, or
distribution of pearls, cultured pearls, or imitation pearls, to use, as part of any packag-
ing material, label, advertisement, or other sales promotion literature, any picture,
illustration, map, diagram, or other depiction which, either alone or in conjunction with
the words or phrases accompanying such depiction, has the capacity and tendency or
effect of misleading or deceiving purchasers or prospective purchasers concerning the
type, kind, grade, quality, quantity, size, character, substance, nature, origin, production,
or preparation of any industry product, or which has the capacity and tendency or effcct
of misleading or deceiving the purchaser or consuming public in any other material
respect.
"Note: For example, earrings set with five millimeter pearls should not be represented
in advertisements by illustrations indicating that the pearl insets are a ten millimeter size.
Likewise, pictures of oysters, deep-sea divers, etc. should not be used in advertisements
of imitation pearls in a manner which creates the impression that the products offered
for sale are pearls or cultured pearls or products of oysters or of the sea." Id. Rule 11.
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In contrast, the antitrust rules have, until recently, never been more than
a restatement of antitrust stptutes. "Boiler plate" provisions summarize Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act;"' others prohibit tie-in clauses and ex-
clusive dealing contracts offensive to Section 3 of the Clayton Act ;1"2 and the
whole gamut of Robinson-Patman prescripts is regularly included.1 3 In 1951,
however, the FTC promulgated rules for the cosmetics industry which specific-
ally interpret, not merely restate, Robinson-Patman provisions dealing with
special services or payments." 4 According to the industry rules, the Act's
requirement that such services rendered by a supplier to a buyer, be "propor-
tionally equal" does not demand that cosmetics manufacturers must provide
identical promotion services for all types of retail outlets: alternative services
of proportionate cost will suffice instead."3  The rules explain in detail
the scope of permissible differentiation in providing services.110 The current
unofficial draft of rules for the athletic goods industry contains provisions
111. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946). See, e.g., Slide Fastener
Industry, Rule 14, which provides: "It is an unfair trade practice for a member of the
industry:
(a) To use, directly or indirectly, any form of threat, intimidation, or cercicn against
any member of the industry or any other person to unlawfully [sic] fix, maintain, or
enhance prices, suppress competition, or restrain trade; or
(b) to enter into or take part in, directly or indirectly, any agreement, understand-
ing, combination, conspiracy, or concerted action with one or more memhrs of the
industry, or with one or more other persons, to unlawfully [sic] fix, maintain, or enhance
prices, suppress competition, or restrain trade." 3 CCH TmwrP RD3. RP. I 20,274 (1950).
112. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946). See, e.g., Venetian Blind Industry,
Rule 23, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. , 20,272 (195U); Candy Industry, Rule 14, id.
20,267 (1950).
113. The prohibitory clauses of the Robinson-Patman Act have been repeatcd virtu-
ally verbatim in 53 of the 60 industry codes promulgated by the Commission since 1940.
3 CCH TRADE Rzo. REP. 20,234-86 (1941-52).
114. 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), (e) (1946).
115. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REa. T 20,212, Rule l(g) (1951). For a discussion, see
Shoenfeld, Now FTC Authorices Altcrnatize Serzices, Sales Mgm't, Jan. 1, 1952, p. it.
The "proportionally equal" provisions of the Act had been criticised as ignoring considera-
tions of efficiency, EDWARDS, MAi-NTAINING Co!1EITIOx 163 (1951). They have b~en
called a "legislative monstrosity," Oppenheim, Should M1e Robinson-Pal,;:an *lct Be
Ancnded? in CCH RonINzsox-PATI.x SymP. 141, 146 (1948). For general discussions,
see Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: .lothcr Looh at Robinson-
Patmnan, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 959, 960 (1951); Layton, Demonstrators on Proportionally
Eqzal Terms in CCH RoaiNSON-PAT.aAx Acr Symp. 51 (1948).
116. E.g., "Provided, however, that when the service, facility or allowance offered is
of a type which under reasonable terms and conditions is not usable or suitable to the
facilities and business of all customers and is offered to any one customer, the memb2r
[may] offer each of those customers to whom the service, facility or allovnce %,hich is
of equivalent measurable cost, is usable by the customer, and is suitable to his facilities
and business, and promptly inform all competing customers of the kind and amount of
services, facilities or allowances which he has offered to each and the respictrime terms
and conditions under which . . . [they] are to be furnished by the industry me'mber."
3 CCH TRADE R.. REP. f'ff 20,620-1 (1951).
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similar to the "proportionally equal" specifications in the Cosmetics Industry
Rules and, additionally, offers further Robinson-Patman interpretation. 117
The Robinson-Patman Act provides that a party may discriminate in price to
"meet competition."11 8 An intricate Supreme Court decision, Standard Oil
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,"9 may be interpreted as holding the "meet-
ing competition" defense a hollow one, applicable only where a discriminator
meets another's "lawful prices."' 20 The unofficial draft, however, sanctions a
much-advocated broader interpretation of the "meeting competition" defense:
the defense is valid insofar as the discriminator is "free of knowledge of any fact
which indicates that the competitor's price" is unlawful. 12' While there are
other indications that the Commission will promulgate further interpretation
and application of the antitrust acts-at least the Robinson-Patman Act 1-=_
117. Trade Practice Conference Attorney's Draft for Use at Conference for the
Athletic Goods Industry, Sept. 18, 1952, Rule 1 (A) (5), copy in Yale Law Library,
provides: "That nothing herein contained shall prevent the meeting in good laith of all
equally low price of a competitor. (Note: Subsection (5), above, is to be understood as
permitting an industry member to meet, but not exceed, the price at which goods of like
grade and quality are actually being sold by a competitor, though such price be lower
than the industry member's price to competing buyers and though the discrimination is
not justified by subsections (1), (2), (3), or (4), above, only when the industry member
is free of knowledge of any fact which indicates that the competitor's price which he is
meeting is discriminatory and unlawful ....
For support for a broad interpretation of Standard Oil, see Rowe, Price Discrhinina.
tion, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patnan, 60 YALE L.J. 929,
970-1 (1951). See also proposed legislation, H.R. 4170, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
118. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1946).
119. 340 U.S. 231 (1951), 36 IowA L. Rav. 351. For interpretation of the decision,
see Rowe, sitpra note 117, at 965-72; Austern, inconsistencies in the Law in CCH AN4Ti-
TRUST LAW SYmP. 158, 166-8 (1951); Simon, Price Discrimination to Meet Competition,
U. or IL.. L. FORUM 575, 584-92 (1950).
120. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 242, 244, 246, 247
n.14, 250 (1951). At page 244, note 10, the Court cites a lower court opinion as "indicat-
ing" that the price met must be lawful, but does not evidence any approval of that
indication. At page 247, note 14, the Court refers to a similar "suggestion" in legislative
history. The most conspicuous reference to "lawful" prices, however, appears in the
heading of Section III of the opinion. Id. at 238. But neither litigant tendered an issue
of lawful prices. Cf. Oral Argument, 18 U.S.L. WEmc 3209-11 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1950).
The decision was apparently interpreted to require that the price met be "lawful" in
Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
121. See note 117 supra.
122. See, e.g., the Majority Statement of the Commission accompanying the Cosmetics
Industry Rules, which stated: "It is true that the rule presents complexities but so does
the law itself, and the Commission being charged with the duty of administering the law
has a corresponding duty to attempt a reasonable interpretation of it in a practical
manner and not refrain therefrom by reason of any suggestion of difficulty or magnitude."
3 CCH TRADE REGa. REP. 20,627 (1951). The main reason other Robinson-Patman inter-
pretations have not been made since the cosmetics conferences has been lack of personnel
in the Rule-Making Unit of the FTC for such work. Interview, Commissioner Lowell
B. Mason, April 2, 1952. And see notes 164-6 infra.
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currently existing rules, apart from sparse Robinson-Patman interpretative
rules, remain overwhelmingly a compilation of "boiler plate" condensations of
the antitrust acts.123
AFTERTMATH OF THE CONFERNCE
Deceptive Practices and Unfair Competition. After a conference the Com-
mission may drop plans to bring formal action against individual firms to
enjoin previous use of practices covered by rules, if firms signify their inten-
tion to abide by the new rules by signing an "acceptance card.'"' -2 Formal
complaints alleging practices covered by the new rules may be terminated by
a motion to suspend, while investigations which have not reached the com-
plaint stage may be halted administratively.'2' However, such actions are
without prejudice to the Commission's right to reopen the matter. In some
situations, the Commission may refuse to settle a complaint even though
compliance is tendered. The Commission specifically restricts use of the trade
conference method as a settlement and correction technique to those firms
which demonstrate a "good faith [intent] to correct unlawful practices on a
cooperative and voluntary basis."' ' Therefore, when there is evidence of
deliberate intent to defraud or of false advertisement of inherently dangerous
products, violations are not closed by a firm's "acceptance" of conference
rules. 2 7
Successful industry-wide settlement requires prompt enforcement against
non-conforming firms. This entails continuing surveillance of competitive
conditions following a conference. Until 1946 the Commission had no estab-
lished machinery for maintaining contact with industries under trade practice
123. See note 113 supra.
124. Acceptance cards are furnished industry members upon promulgation of trade
rules for their industry and are for their own use in ackmowledging receipt of a copy
of the rules and voluntarily expressing their intention to follow the provisions thereof
in the conduct of their business. By signing an acceptance card one does not, according
to the Commission, divest himself of any legal rights or otherwise subject himself to the
imposition of any restrictions not imposcd by existing la. Communication to the
YAL LAW JouxNAI. from James M. Mead, then-Chairman, FTC, dated November 6,
1951, in Yale Law Library.
125. FTC ANN. REP. 114 (1948).
126. Ibid. A statement of policy as to settlement of cases by Trade Practice Con-
ference procedures Was adopted on Aug. 19, 1947, 12 FED. REG. 5S11 (1947) re-
printed in FTC ANN. RE. 113 (1948)). For typical industry comment, see FTC Selttng
Up Trade Practice Conferences to Settle Complaints, Iron Age, Aug. 25, 1947, p. 110
(statement interpreted as not making wide departure from policies previously in force,
but at least indicating that the Commission had placed itself in a position to take a more
liberal view of industry demands for settlement of disputes through trade practice con-
ference procedures; it was thought to be the result of strong pressure for such actioa
from higher official sources, probably the White House). Commissioner Mason states
the Commission seldom permits cases to be settled by trade practice conferences. Inter-
view, April 2, 1952.
127. FTC ANx. REP. 114 (194).
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rules.'2 8 In that year, however, the Rules Administration Unit of the Con-
ference Division was established as a key part of the new emphasis on volun-
tary cooperative procedures to maintain law observance. 129 Today, the Unit
consists of a chief and about eleven assistants. 30 This small staff bears the
major responsibility for supervision of all rules promulgated since its estab-
lishment, 131 and in addition attempts to bring industries with older rules into
effective cooperation with the Commission.13 2
Complaints processed by the Rules Administration Unit come from a
variety of sources. To some extent members of the Unit are able to check
128. Commissioner Mason stated onl June 7, 1946, that of the 150 trade practice
conference industries, "there has not been a one of those which has been supervised or
had anybody to call on them." He noted further that although "there is a constantly
changing complexion . . . [of personnel] in the industr[ies], [yet] for 20 years we have
not had one . . . [man] go around and supervise or study or give any help to these 150
Industries which had trade practice conferences." FTC TRANSCIPT, HEAMIN;S, TlluDt IlL-
FIclENC, APPROPRIATION BILL FOR 1946, p. 22 (June 7, 1946), copy in Yale Law Library.
Appropriations for trade practice conference work were only $34,633 in 1945, FTC ANN.
REP. 83 (1945), and $26,057 in 1946, id. at 74 (1946). Yet the very small staff permitted by
such appropriations conducted a number of conferences and negotiations through whieh
many highly technical rules were formulated. Id. at 65 (1945) ; id. at 52-4 (1946) ; 3 CCI
TRADE REG. REP. 1111 20,405-39 (1945-6). It is therefore doubtful that any significant
amount of time was spent in rule administration. The discussions of seemingly extensive
administrative activities and informal enforcement contained in the Commission reports
(FTC ANN. REP. 65 (1945) ; id. at 54 (1946)) are therefore misleading as to the actual
state of affairs in trade rule administration at that time. After the Rules Administration
Unit was established, and appropriations for trade conference work had doubled over that
of the preceeding two years, the Commission guardedly said that "rule administration
activities were undertaken to the extent possible with the personnel available for this
work." Id. at 88 (1947).
129. Id. at 2, 4, 71. Commissioner Mason was the chief advocate of the development
of rule administration as a substitute for formal prosecution of a small l)ortion of violators.
Zealous Men of FTC, Fortune, Feb., 1952, pp. 107-8. For his views, see such representative
public addresses as Regulation by Conference, Oct. 13, 1947; FTC and Busiwss-Friend¢s
or Foesf, Nov. 14, 1947; First, Give Bitsiness the Job, Not the Works, April 6, 1948; The
Federal Trade Commission with a New Look, Nov. 14, 1949; copies in Yale Law Library,
For business reaction, see Clark, FTC Tackles the Gyp-Artist; Calls Industry-wide Con-
ferences that Correct Abuses, Protect Consumers and Itdustry Itself, Advertising & Sell-
ing, March 1947, p. 112; FTC on a New Tack, Business Week, Nov. 30, 1946, p. 55; FTC
Setting up Trade Practice Conferences to Settle Complaints, Oil Paint & Drug Rep,,
Aug. 25, 1947, p. 5; Nichols, FTC and Business Can be Friends Under Trade Practice
Conference Plan, Printer's Ink, Sept. 27, 1946, p. 44; Cohen, FTC's Trade Practice Con-
ference Program Reflects New Industrial Attitude, Indust. Marketing, Jan. 19, 1947,
p. 41. Congress appropriated $34,633 for trade practice conference activities in fiscal
1945, out of a total FTC appropriation of $2,054,070. FTC ANN. Rup. 83 (1945). By
fiscal 1951, this sum had been increased to $236,600 out of a total FTC appropriation of
$3,771, 968. Id. at 91 (1951).
130. INTERvIEws.
131. FTC ANN. REP. 4, 71 (1947) ; id. at 61, 64 (1952).
132. The FTC's "administration" of older rules consists almost exclusively of process-
ing complaints received. Personnel limitations have not permitted the establishment
of effective liaison with many older rules industries. INTERVIEWS.
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compliance by field trips in which they contact key firms and trade as-ocia-
tion executives.1m Some information is forwarded by consumers injured by
a rule violation. But the bulk of complaints originate either from competitur-i
anxious to see the rules observed, or from the Bureau of Antideceptive Prac-
tices which does e.xtensive checking to uncover deceptive practice.s in adver-
tising and labeling. 34 In addition, industry committees have been established,
following a number of recent conferences, which seek to enforce observance
of the Commission's rules.' 35 Normally, such committees make the first effort
to obtain compliance. Rules Administration seeks to maintain close liaison
with these committees, and stubborn cases are forwarded to the FTC for
action.' 3 6
Enforcement by the Rules Administration Unit proceeds on a highly in-
formal, flexible basis. Operating on the belief that a timely w%-arning is uiten
more effective than a tardy prosecution, 37 the Unit has placed its chief
emphasis on contact by informal correspondence, office conferences, and field
visits.' 3s While firms often maintain stoutly that their challenged conduct is
not illegal, the Unit is usually able to persuade businessmen to modify their
practices in a way which is satisfactory to the FTC.' Such changes in
behavior can be obtained by presenting far less evidence and factual data
than would be required to justify the issuance of a cease and desist order or
even a formal complaintY4  Ease of enforcement, however, often depends
on the type of rule involved. Businessmen comply more readily with a ¢pecific
"custom-made" rule developed especially for the industry than vith the gen-
133. Ibid. See also note 131 supra.
134. Other than violations reported by other FTC Divisions, ab ,ut eighty i,.rcuit
of complaints come from industry sources (primarily competitors) and abut ten p:r-
cent from trade associations and better businss bureaus. The Rules Admini',trati
Unit undertakes practically no investigatory activities. I.;TrvIEvW S. The Bureau co. Anti-
deceptive Practices. Division of Investigation, xxas the prime source for report, ,,f pozsiblv
deceptive advertising. That division supplied a total of 14,10 questionable advertise-
ments to FTC operating division in 1952, a large portion being sent to the Rules Administra-
tion Unit. FTC AN-z. REP. 51 (1952).
135. While a great many such committees have officially breu establithCd, -tte, e.y..
3 CCH TADE REG. REP. WI 20,102-287 (1952), only about 10 are active to any effectihe
extent at this time. INTIVWIEWS.
136. INTavIEWs.
137. See speeches of Commissioner Mason, note 129 supra, Mason, FTC's Scrch fur
a New Role, Standardization, January, 1951, pp. 5, 8.
138. FTC ANx. REP. 70 (1952). Administration oi rules nuow alsu involves all ZCa-
sional industry conference in which top FTC Bureau of Industry Cooperation officials
answer questions of industry members about the meaning of variious rule previsionso Sc.,
Osrc. WiaoEsALaERs NAT. Ass'Nz, nrc, Cocirza~mzc rrrEo:,' (190, cohpy in Yale La,
Library (containing transcript of proceedings of Optical Wholesalers C&nfirenci , Xov.
9, 1950, the first of such conferences, held for "informative dscussion" of the rccetly
promulgated rules for the Wholesale Optical Goods Industry).
139. I.xrRvinws; FTC ANN. REP. 70 (1952).
140. I--,-riavinws.
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eralized "boiler plate" provisions.141 The latter are open to more disputes over
interpretation, and Unit personnel often must attempt to show the application
of the rule to the challenged practice by pointing to related FTC orders or
decisions.142 This experience seems to have reinforced the Conference Divi-
sion's recent drive to emphasize specially-tailored rather than "boiler plate"
rules.' 43
Where administrative persuasion fails to achieve satisfactory results in any
case handled by the Rules Administration Unit, the case is referred to the
Commission for formal enforcement by the Bureau of Antideceptive Prac-
tices. 44 The Bureau's formal complaint, however, will not charge violation of
the rule as such.145 Instead, since the Commission has no direct statutory
authority to issue trade practice rules,146 the offending practice is attacked
either as a "deceptive act or practice" or "unfair method of competition"
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, or as a "false adver-
tisement" under Section 12 of the Act. In fact, the rules normally are not
even introduced in evidence, although the respondent may have attended the
conference and signed an acdeptance card.147
Why the Commission avoids mention of the trade rules in formal proceed-
ings is not wholly clear. One possibility is that the FTC wishes to avoid
possible court challenge of its Trade Conference Program.148 Additionally,
Trial Examiners -thus far have declined to take official notice in any complaint
141. Ixraammvs.
142. Ibid.
143. See, e.g., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. fff" 20,285, 20,284, 20,283 (1952); id. 20,281
(1951).
144. FTC ANN. RaP. 71 (1952); id. at 76 (1951). If and when informal admilnistra-
tion of the Clayton Act is authorized, continued violations of that Act not amenable to
informal settlements would be referred to the Bureau of Antimonopoly for formal prosecu-
tion.
145. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from William M. King, Chief, Div. of
Litigation, Bureau of Antideceptive Practices, FTC, dated March 12, 1953, in Yale Law
Library.
146. 4 CALJmAN 2034.
147. See Communication from William M. King, supra note 145, stating that "rules
are not introduced in evidence, regardless of whether or not such member of the industry
had subscribed or agreed thereto." However, rules, on occasion, have in fact been intro-
duced in FTC proceedings as evidence of industry-recognized standards. See, e.g., Fresh
Grown Preserve Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission, 37 F.T.C. 824, 827-8 (2d Cir.
1943) (a partial report of the case is found in 139 F.2d 200).
148. In a trade practice conference in 1928 for cottonseed oil producers, rules
fixing the price the producers were to pay to cotton ginners for cottonseed were agreed
upon by the industry and approved by the Commission. A private suit was brought,
charging that the conference and price-fixing agreed upon constituted a conspiracy and
unlawful combine in restraint of trade, under state antitrust laws. The court discount d
conduct in conformity with FTC Trade Practice Rules as being a defense, holding nothing
in the FTC Act authorized the Commission to approve and promulgate such rules. Dothan
Oil Mill Co. v.' Espy, 220 Ala. 605 (1930), 127 So. 178 (1930).
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proceedings of prior Commission decisions on similar or identical issues149
Non-use of trade rules as evidence is consistent with such a policy but
apparently not necessary. Moreover, Trade Practice Conference Division ex-
perts may be relied upon to testify to the deceptiveness of practices banned
in the trade rules as a part of the "substantial evidence" of illegality presented
in each contested proceeding. 50 Proof of a similar conclusion by a trade rule
may be considered largely superfluous or irrelevant.
Despite the FTC's reluctance to develop legal backing for its rules, rule
provisions offer an accurate prediction of Commission attitudes toward par-
ticular trade practices.'5 1 Unless a respondent can convince the Commission
that, in effect, the rule provision previously promulgated was an inappropriate
interpretation of law, in which case the rule would be revised, 152 use of a
practice condemned in a Group I rule normally vill be enjoined by a Com-
mission cease and desist order as a violation of the statute it interpets.'" And
courts rarely disturb Commission findings of deceptiveness; the findings are
conclusive on appeal if supported by evidence.154 Thus Trade Practice Rules
are enforced in fact, though they are not given de jure recognition.
149. Communication from William M. King, supra note 145.
150. In contested'proceedings, "the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if
supported by evidence, shall be conclusive" 33 ST.T. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)
(1946). This has been interpreted to mean, e.g., that "the findings of the Commission [are]
conclusive if supported by testimony," Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education
Society, 302 U.S. 112, 117 (1937), rez,crsing 86 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1936); that "the
outcome turns, . . . upon whether there was 'substantial' evidence to support the Com-
mission's finding." Segal v. Federal Trade Commission, 142 F2d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1944).
Until August, 1951, the Commission held hearings for the reception of evidence support-
ing the allegations of a complaint even though the respordent failcd to answer and appear
for a hearing. FTC ANx. REP. 79 (1952). In uncontested cases, "default orders" are
now issued Without production of evidence. FTC Rules of Practice, Rule 5(b), 16 .t1.
REo. 6503 (1951).
151. Kittelle & Mostow, A Revw' of the Trade Practice Confcrences of iw Fedcral
Trade Connnissios, S GEao. WAsH. L. Rv. 427, 449 (1940).
152. Ixrvmws.
153. The Commission officially states that all Group I rules empress requirements
of laws administered by the Commission and adherence to them by all industry members
is mandatory, despite non-participation. FTC An,. Rm,. 63 (1952). Any substantive
violation of a rule still approved by the Commission would be grounds for a cease and
desist order according to Bureau of Industry Cooperation officials. Iimr-amvas. But cf.
Communication to the Y.aE LAW Jou1mu.A from William M. King, Chief, Div. of Litiga-
tion, Bureau of Antideceptive Practices, dated March 12, 1953, in Yale Law Library,
stating: "These rules are designed to establish standards of practice and conduct and
constitute, as it were, a code of ethics; but they do not have any force of law. .. ." At
least one observer believes that some Group I rules do not accurately express the require-
ments of the statutes they purport to interpret, and therefore a violation of such Group I
rules would not be illegal. Weil, FTC's Industry Rules: How Do They Affect Yors?,
Printer's Ink, September 2, 1949, pp. 42, 68. Nevertheless, the Commission does obtain
considerable de facto compliance With such interpretations of the law by writing them into
the Rules. Ibid.
154. See note 150 supra. The Commission might encounter some difficulty in obtain-
ing substantial evidence that failure to follow a custom-made affirmative disclosure pro-
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Antitrust Violations. As late as this date, Commission procedures follow-
ing a conference and formulation of trade rules have not been officially modi-
fied to produce and encourage informal settlements in antitrust cases. Clearly,
most trade rule antitrust provisions, since they are merely verbatim statements
of the antitrust statutes, could not be expected to augur or require any altera-
tion in Commission insistence on full prosecution of all antitrust offenders.
And, in fact, antitrust enforcement activity proceeds with practically no regard
for the Trade Conference Programs.155 But in the cosmetics and wholesale
optical goods industries, where "custom-made" Robinson-Patman trade rules
have been promulgated, 1 6 informal procedures along the lines of those used for
deceptive practices might be anticipated. The pattern of administration of
these rules is unclear. The 1952 Annual Report of the Commission asserts that
the Rules Administration Unit is checking on compliance with the cosmetics
industry's Robinson-Patman rules, and indicates that informal enforcement
activity is taking place. 5 7 But there has been no announcement of official
change in the Commission's view that the Clayton Act does not permit in-
formal settlement of violations of such rules ;118 officially, the Bureau of Anti-
monopoly still has exclusive jurisdiction over these situations.1 , There are
indications, however, that some official change may be forthcoming, by which the
Rules Unit will be authorized to correct Robinson-Patman violations inform-
ally.
Recently, the Commission held hearings on its legal authority to engage in
informal settlement in the Clayton-Robinson-Patman field. C0 At least part
of the Commission's attitude of insistence on full prosecution stems from the
wording of the enforcement mandate of the Clayton Act.'"1 But whatever
validity this interpretation of the Clayton Act previously possessed may now
be irrelevant under Section 5(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act.102
vision would result in deception of purchasers unless such disclosure is clearly needed.
See, e.g., Mary Muffet v. Federal Trade Commission, 194 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1952)
(provision to distinguish rayon from silk). The FTC burden may be lightened where past
deceptive claims of the particular respondent must be countered by conspicuous and accu-
rate affirmative disclosures. See, e.g., Haskelite Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commissiou,
127 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1942). Courts seem willing, however, to support al order of the
Commission on affirmative disclosure requirements unless there is a clear abuse of dis-
cretion. See, e.g., Hillman Periodicals v. Federal Trade Commission, 174 F.2d 122 (2d
Cir. 1949) (order for conspicuous notice of abridgement of novels upheld).
155. Statement of Policy, FTC, ANN. RzP. 138 (1951).
156. See notes 115, 116 supra.
157. FTC ANN. REP 70-1 (1952).
158. For ban on informal settlements of Robinson-Patman Act violations, see State-
ment of Policy, FTC ANN. REp. 137 (1951). See also Answering Statemnt to Com-
missioner Mason's 'Concurring' Statement in Gruen Watch Company, FTC Dock. No.
5836, March 17, 1952.
159. FTC ANN. REP. 13 (1951).
160. Food, Drug & Cosmetics Reports W-4, November 8, 1952; id. W-1, August 2, 1952.
161. See note 54 supra.
162. 60 STAT. 239-40 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(b) (1946).
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This section of the APA offers general authorization for informal settlements,
and legislative history indicates that the provision was aimed particularly at
the FTC.163 Several months ago, a Commissioner was selected to conduct
formal hearings on the issue, with the Bureau of Industry Cooperation sup-
porting a change to informal procedures, and the Bureau of Antimonopoly
defending the status quo.10 4
The deletion from its latest annual report of a standard feature of prior
reports-a "statement of policy" containing a ban on informal settlements '"
-also suggests a change may be forthcoming. A further indication is the
more recent Commission announcement that it is dropping its old complaints
against six cosmetics firms,10 6 for use of practices condemned in the Elirabeth
Arden case. This unprecedented maneuver by the Commission is apparently
in partial recognition of the fact that the firms' prior violations have apparently
been abandoned in good faith adherence to the new Cosmetics Industry
Rules. Consequently, latest developments in all areas of FTC operation
seem to constitute the prelude to attempts to extend the Trade Conference Pro-
gram replete with informal methods of settlement at least into the Robinson-
Patman area of the antitrust field.
Impact of Trade Practice Con fcrcvce Program
The precise impact of the Trade Practice Conference Program on competi-
tive behavior is difficult to appraise. Detailed studies of the extent of deceptive
practices in an industry before and after a trade conference apparently have
never been made.167 Statistics based on formal complaints in rules and non-
rules industries are unreliable because the Commissions limited enforcement
staff results in sporadic and arbitrary case coverage of complaints' cs Conse-
quently, observations on the e-xtent of industry compliance must be based on
informed opinions of industry members and FTC officials, a special field study
of rule compliance in one industry, and on inferences from limited data in
the Commission's official reports.
Estimates of the Conference Program's impact differ widely. The last
major summary of information was issued by the TNEC in 1941.1cO Relying
primarily on opinions expressed in large numbers of commendatory letters re-
ceived by the FTC from industry members, the TNEC reported that the rule
program had made a strong impact on competitive conditions.170 Bureau of
163. DAVIs, A mDINISTRATIvE LAW 155 (1951).
164. See note 160 supra.
165. FTC ANN. REP. 136 (1951); id. at 127 (1950); id. at 114 (1949); id. at 113
(1948) ; id. at 119 (1947) ; id. at 101 (1946) ; id. at 93 (1945).
166. 21 U.S.L. VEE 2364 (FTC Jan. 27, 1953).
167. Communication to the YAm LAw Joum u. from Allen C. Phelps, Chief, Div. of
Trade Practice Conf., FTC, dated May 29, 1952, in Yale Law Library.
168. See notes 13, 19, 36 supra.
169. CoNrMoL oF UNFAIm Co MPrrar PRAcricEs THnotrG Tm~vz Pumcncn Cmr -
FEREINCE PROcEDURE OF THm FEDERAL TRADE Coism.ssioq (TNEC Monograph 34, 1941).
170. Id. at 19, 25.
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Industry Cooperation officials today place similar emphasis on the continuing
stream of congratulatory letters stimulated by recent conferences. 17 1 A recent
industry-sponsored survey, however, indicates businessmen may hold less
laudatory views in private. 172 For example, a majority of the responses from
industries covered by rules existing at the time of the TNEC report indicate
a belief that the rules had little significant effect on competitive practices.17 3
A similar dichotomy exists within the Commission itself: men in trade con-
ference work believe the contemporary program is highly effective, while those
in the enforcement divisions generally hold a contrary view.1 4 The Com-
171. Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from James A. Horton, Director,
Bureau of Industry Cooperation, FTC, dated March 5, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
172. Views were made known to the Editors through a poll of representatives of 90
of the industries covered by Rules. The poll was conducted in 1952 by an industry group
considering trade rules in order to gather information on the desirability of requesting a
conference program for their industry. A copy of a confidential summary of this poll has
been loaned to the YALE LAw JOURNAL. However, to preserve the confidential nature
of this material, particular industries or respondents will not be identified. This study
will be hereinafter cited 1952 INDUSTRY STUDY OF RULES.
Generally, views expressed in trade journals are unrevealing. New FTC rules are re-
ceived with some fanfare and little adverse comment. See note 94 supra. A striking ex-
ception to the somewhat docile attitude of business towards the rules was that shown
by segments of the oil heating industry of the New England states toward the rules
promulgated for that industry in July, 1949. On July 6, 1949, the National Pelroleum
News reported: "New England fuel oil men are fuming over FTC's speedy approval
and adoption of an 'oil heating industry' trade practice code while the fuel oil men still
were protesting at the mere prospect that such a code might be brought forth .... FTC
brought forth the new code just 10 days after a Washington hearing with only a few
changes from the draft discussed there." National Petroleum News, July 6, 1949, p. 18.
The code was requested by the Oil Heat Institute of New England and opposed by the
Independent Oil Men's Ass'n of New England, ibid., and the National Oil Jobbers Coun-
cil. Id., July 27, 1949, p. 14. The FTC apparently did not give individual notice to the
thousands of independent fuel oil men in the New England states, who although il intra-
state commerce and beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, were urged to comply with
the promulgated rules. Id. at 13. Two trade associations asked that the rules be with-
drawn and submitted to the industry. However, when the Commissioners offered repre-
sentatives of the associations only 15 minutes in which to present their suggestions for
resubmission, the industry spokesmen declined to appear. Id., Aug. 3, 1949, p. 20. The
Commission's official position was that the rules could be modified at any time upon
proper showing of need. Id., Aug. 10, 1949, p. 23. Its rather sharp treatment of industry
protests was probably due to loud industry charges of "creeping socialism," etc., directed
toward the Commission's efforts to assume "advisory jurisdiction" over the intrastate
operators through a set of largely "boiler plate" rule provisions. Id., July 27, p. 13; id., Aug.
10, 1949, pp. 23-4. It seems likely that the Commission has had little success however in
securing voluntary cooperation from those making the loud protests against the rules
and conference procedures employed.
173. 1952 INDusTRY STUDY OF RULES.
174. IxmTvIEws. Interbureau rivalry may be a primary cause of this difference of
opinion. The Small Business Committee of the House reported: "Internal strife and
office politics pervade the [FTC].... [Tjhere are many small cliques and groups whose
chief interest is in personal authority and advancement. . . .The strengthening of part
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missioners range in their viewpoint from strong support to considerable
skepticism. 75
An initial distinction should be made between conferences held before and
after 1946, the year in which the Rules Administration Unit was established.
Prior to that time, promulgation of a code of rules virtually marked the end of the
FTC's cooperative efforts.-," Once issued, the rules apparently were ignored
by the Commission, except in their annual reports. 7 7 The program wa largely
educational; the rules gave a guide to the honest as to what conduct the
Commission considered illegal. Moreover, in many industries, even the edu-
cational effect was minimal. During the 1920's, rules were formulated ostens-
ibly under Commission auspices, but, in fact, with little FTC supervision over
rule content. 78 Eventually the Justice Department complained that the Com-
mission's conference program had become an instrument of Sherman Act con-
spiracy.' 75 Somewhat red-faced,'-'U the Commission hastily withdrevw e:dsting
industry rules and during 1931 and 1932 issued revised versions vithout con-
sultation with the industries involved, and over their protests.1 8' These
amended rules were composed largely of broad "boiler plate" provisions, many
of which were expressed in terms of legal conclusions 182 rather than specific
of the Commission's program is inevitably viewed by those interested in uther activitic,
as nothing less than a raid on their activities." H.R. No. 323, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
16 (1951). Traditionally, the prosecuting functions have attracted many of the most
able men in the Commission, and much resistance to the trade practice conference and
industry cooperation programs has come from those with Civil Service litigation classifi-
cations. (Confidential Sources.)
175. See Zealous Men of FTC, Fortune, Feb., 1952, p. 106.
176. See note 128 suPra.
177. Ibid.
178. GAsKIL 119.
179. In an address on May 1, 1930, John Lord O'Brian, Assistant to the Attrncy
General, stated that price fixing had been attempted in some instances "by a misuse of
so-called codes of ethics or trade rules." MnILr=, UTI.TFAR CoMP ri'ro:i 271 (1941). See
note 148 supra. Similar criticisms and warnings had been expressed by the Commission's
own legal staff, by outside observers, and consumer groups. G.%sxu. 120; Kittelle &
Mostow, A Review of Trade Practice Conferences of the Federal Trade Con:n:mission, 8
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 427, 436 (1940).
189. GASKILL 120-3.
181. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce called a protest meeting in Washington of all
affected industries in May, 1930. A second meeting was held in Niagara Falls, N.Y., late
in September, 1930, called the "Congress of Industries," attended by representatives of
110 industries. This meeting expressed itself strongly against the revisions of the rules,
and in some instances pursuaded the Commission to modify its revisions. BLuSuzLL, Tar
FEDER. T-ADE Cosssio.N 96, 97 (1932); GASKILL 122.
182. Group I rules, such as those forbidding the making of false or deceptive state-
ments, imitation of trade-marks, or the defamation of competitors were formalized and
restricted to instances "having the tendency or capacity to mislead or deceive pur-
chasers or prospective purchasers." Selling below cost, consignment selling, and com-
mercial bribery were prohibited only when used "with the intent and %%ith the effect of
injuring a competitor and where the effect may be to substantially [sic] lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly or to unreasonably [sic] restrain trade." "The nct
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descriptions of the practices disapproved or approved.18 3 Similar codes, phrased
in generalities, were issued throughout the early 1930's except during the
period of the NRA.18 4  But even where rules were specific, since the Com-
mission did little to effectuate compliance, forbidden practices were readopted,
and borderline practices continued unchallenged. As a result, a large portion
of the 179 codes even currently "under administration" have little educational
effect, either because they have been forgotten or are so general or so outdated
that they do not reflect newly developed practices and cannot be enforced
fairly against practices banned.'
8 5
Some rules devised through the earlier conferences, however, fulfilled the
educational function admirably and seem to have had a substantial impact on
industry conditions.'8 6 In general, the successful codes were those with many
specific rules, clearly indicating which particular industry practices were con-
sidered deceptive and illegal-especially valuable in industries where condi-
tions had been haotic and deception rife.'8 7 These "custom-made" rules
effect of these revisions was to confine Group I rules to a standardized set of rules
[covering practices] which were clearly illegal under existing law, adding nothing new
in principle and little in detail. . . ." MILLER, UNFAIR COMP.TITIOx 272 (1941). For
detailed illustrations of changes, see Hearings before Subcomnittee of the Senate Con-
inttee of the .Tudiciary on S2626, "S.2627, S2628, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 298-305 (1932).
183. See, e.g., 3 CCH TADE REG. REP. ff 20,131 (1931). Group II rules deleted
from the revisions included prohibitions of guarantees against price changes, ant[
dumping provisions, elaborate provisions for publication of prices, allowances, and price
changes, and elaborate regulations of competitive bidding in those industries where
sealed bids are used. MILLER, op. cit. supra note 182, at 272. For detailed illustrations,
see Hearings, supra note 182.
184. Much of industry drive toward regulation of competitive practices which had
been manifest in the trade practice conference program was implemented for a while through
the ill-fated NRA program. GASKILL 129, 149. For comparison with NRA Code provisions,
see KAIDANOVSKY, TRADE PRACTICE CONFF.RENCE RULES OF TnE FTC (NRA Div. of
Rev., Work Materials 54, 1936).
185. 1952 INDUSTY STUDY OF RULES. For delays in rule revisions, see note 191
infra.
186. Kittelle & Mostow, A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 8 Gm. WAsH. L. REv. 427, 449, 450 (1940); Nelson, Trade
Practice Conference Rules and the Consumer, 8 GFo. WASH. L. REv. 452, 467 (1940).
187. Confidential letters received in survey of trade association executives conducted
by YALE LAw JoLmNAL, Jan.-Feb., 1953 (hereinafter cited as 1953 JouRNAL SuvEv).
One of the first elaborate codes was that for the rayon industry promulgated in 1937,
which represented a sharp break with immediate trade rule precedents. A novel feature
of these rules was their affirmative disclosure requirements. E.g., Rayon Industry,
Rule 2 (3) declared that it was an unfair trade practice to offer for sale rayon products
"without disclosure of the fact that such material or product is rayon." 3 CCH TRADE
REG. REi'. ff 20,206 (1937, rev. 1951). The campaign leading directly to the adoption of
these rules was inaugurated by various consumer groups. [1937] J. or HoME EcoN.
466, 698. Consumer group and retailer demands were reflected in the preparation of
the rules. Since the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1946), adding a prohibition of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to § 5 of the
FTC Act, had not been adopted at the time of the promulgation of these rules, there
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were often backed by organized consumer or industry groups anxious to see
that all competitors compiled with FTC requirements, 3 This increased the
likelihood that private pressure or formal FTC prosecution would be em-
ployed to curb rule violations. But where these pressures were lacldng, any
initial improvement resulting from the educational efforts of the Conference
Division appears to have been dissipated as banned practices were gradually
readopted. IsO
Rules promulgated in the last decade appear to have had a more impressive
effect.' 0 Greater numbers of specific rules are included in present-day codes,
and some, but insufficient, attempts are made to revise old rules and bring them
up to date.191 As a result, some sets of rules do constitute reliable criteria
for those in the industry who wish to transact business entirely within the
confines of the law."9 2 And since most industry representatives at the original
conferences are still engaged in active management, the educational impact
of the rules is considerable. At the same time, available evidence indicates that
the recent conferences have achieved a higher degree of initial compliance, and
subsequent conformity with the rules seems better sustained.10 3 This may be
was a considerable body of opinion that the affirmative disclosure requirement of the
textile industry rules went beyond the scope of the authority of the Commission. See
Kittelle & Campbell, Power of the Federal Trade Commission to Reqrdre Inform;:ati'e
Labeling of Textiles, 20 B.U.L. REv. 23 (1940). The Commission's requirement cif
affirmative labeling of rayon products was upheld in Mary Muffet, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 194 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1952).
188. See note 187 supra.
189. 1952 ImUSTRY STUDY oF RULES.
190. Ibid.
191. At least 65 of the 180 rules currently in force are in dire need of revision.
Ixrlavmws. Five of the eleven sets of rules promulgated in fiscal year 1952 -ere re-
visions of existing rules, FTC ANx. REP. 64 (1952); two revisions were among the
nine sets of rules promulgated during the preceding year. Id. at 71-4 (1951). During
fiscal year 1950, only one of the ten sets of rules promulgated was a revision. Id. at 62
(1950). Thus, at the current rate of revision, there are probably more rules bacoming
obsolete each year than are being revised and brought up to date.
192. ,Veil, F.T.C.'s Industry Rules: How Do They Affect You?, Printer's Int,
Sept. 2, 1949, pp. 42, 47, 48.
193. 1952 Iimusmv STUDY oF RULr.S; 1953 Joua.-aL Sunrny. And se, e.g., auto
financing experience: following the promulgation of the trade practice rules dealing
with installment sale and financing of motor vehicles, 3 CCH TrAnE REG. REP. 20,273
(1951), 43,000 dealers and finance companies signed and returned to the Commission
acceptance cards signifying their intention to comply with the rules. FTC A:N::. REP.
72 (1952). Apparently 75,000 firms were sent such cards. Note, Protection of .lutomo-
bile Installment Buyers: The FTC Steps In, 61 YALE LJ. 718, 726 n.35 (1951). Accept-
ance cards were received from 2,018 business firms following the various industry con-
ferences held in fiscal 1952, but the Commission did not reveal how many were mailed
to industry members. FTC ANN. REP. 63 (1952). The Commission is currently receiv-
ing a large number of commendatory letters from members of industries covered by
rules supporting the trade practice conference work in all its aspects. Communication
to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from James A. Horton, Director, Bureau of Industry Co-
operation, FTC, dated March 5, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
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attributed, in large part, to the "follow up" program of the Rules Administra-
tion Unit in using the rules as a basis for informal enforcement. Before 1945,
unless a complaint of rule violation was addressed specifically to the Trade
Practice Conference Division, it was sent to another FTC Division for formal
action; and, if personnel could be spared, the violation was formally enjoined
by a cease and desist order. 94  A number of such violations were enjoined
in the 150-200 orders issued by the Commission each year before the Unit was
put into operation.9 5 But by informal means alone, the Rules Administration
Unit now reportedly halts rule violations on an average of 1000 cases per year,
a figure almost three times the number of formal orders issued annually by all
FTC enforcement staffs combined. 190  And apparently, informal methods of
obtaining compliance are successful: less than than 3 percent of reported
violations have to be forwarded to other Bureaus for formal enforcement. 0 7
However, these indicia of the program's efficacy in obtaining compliance must
be read with other facts. There is direct evidence that rule compliance,
despite many "acceptance cards," is a myth in areas where direct door-to-door
selling is involved.198 And reports of "successful" termination of offenders'
activities must be tempered by recognition that the referent of "success" is
194. INTaaviws. See, e.g., Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 139 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1943).
195. At the beginning of fiscal year ending June 30, 1945, the Commission had
pending 448 complaints, and docketed 164 during the year. It issued 140 orders to cease
and desist, settled 4 by stipulations, settled 7 by acceptance of trade practice rules; dis-
missed or closed 19, and had 444 still pending at the end of the year. FTC ANN. Rn:r.
60, table 2 (1945).
196. By informal methods, the Rules Administration Unit made "satisfactory dispo-
sition" of 949 cases in fiscal year 1952, FTC ANx. REP'. 70 (1952), and 1,100 cases in
fiscal year 1951. Id. at 76 (1951). In fiscal year 1951, the Bureau of Antimonopoly issued
23 orders to cease and desist unlawful practices, and the Bureau of Antideceptive
Practices issued 98. Id. at 35, 49. In fiscal 1952, these two Bureaus issued 26 and 108
orders respectively. Id. at 27, 41 (1952).
197. 1,100 cases were settled informally in 1951, only 31 were referred to other
Bureaus. Id. at 76 (1951).
198. Extensive research on the compliance of industry salesmen with applicable
rules of the subscription and mail-order book publishing industry, promulgated September
3, 1940, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 20,233 (1940), indicates that although after promulga-
tion of the rules the officers of most member companies no longer participate actively
in the banned deceptive practices, most salesmen of the companies continue them.
In the most flagrant example uncovered, the "sales pitch" used by one group of approxi-
mately 20 salesmen, all working for one company, and under the supervision of one sales
manager, contained practically every one of the deceptive practices banned in the in-
dustry's elaborate custom-made rules, as well as supplementary rules which the
industry voluntarily adopted to "reinforce" the FTC rules. SunscuvpTrN BooK Pun-
LISHERS, ADDITIONAL STANDARDS (1951), copy in Yale Law Library. Salesmen are dis-
charged for violations of the rules, but the companies usually have a loose organizational
structure which minimizes "main office" "contact with salesman. Superficially, at least,
this "frees" the companies of any knowledge of the deceptive practices being used in
sales and training programs. While industry officials have been active in the formulation
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defined by the tiny eleven-man Rules Administration Unit. Of course, eleven
men cannot maintain constant surveillance of the 954,000 rules industry mem-
bers; undoubtedly many continued illegal activities remain undiscovered. And,
in the light of their huge task, the Unit might well accept as "compliance"
activities that others, such as the Bureau of Antideceptive Practices might
heartily condem. But in any event, there is at least one other indication
that the program does have some effect: industry requests for conferences seem
to be increasing, and many businessmen are offering the FTC complete co-
operation in the program. 1 99
Antitrust Violations
Until recently, the Trade Practice Conference Program has had little im-
pact on obtaining compliance with antitrust laws. As has been mentioned,
antitrust trade rules were cast in generalities so broad that they added nothing
to the antitrust statutes. And while more recent sets of rules have interpreted
the Robinson-Patman Act for concrete industry problems, it is still too early
to assess the effect, if any, of compliance activities to date320 Only one fact
seems clear: cosmetics and optical goods firms who wish to provide services
or discounts to customers now have guide posts marking legitimate ways--at
least insofar as the FTC is concerned-that will not result in prosecution
under some of the more troublesome clauses of the Robinson-Patman Act.
THE TRADE RULE IN LITIGATION
While the FTC does not itself use trade rules in litigation, other parties
may. Of course, where trade rules merely restate statutory provisions or
concern practices already held illegal in adversary proceedings before the
Commission or the courts, the rules are of no value in litigation either to the
FTC or anyone else; statutes or decisions provide the authority and precedent
for suit. There are trade rules, however, which explore new ground and
which may even conceivably contravene court holdings.201 Were the FTC
and publication of the two sets of trade rules, and urge compliance within the industry,
these efforts are apparently rarely directed toward the salesmen or Fales managers of their
own companies. BF-RIGAL, COPLmNCE WITH TRAE: PnUbcTICE RuxLFS n Sunsepac-n0
Boo% I.DusmY 43, 44, 50-53 (unpublished report in Yale Law Library, 1953).
199. Communication to the YALE LAW JourAnI. from James A. Horton, Director,
Bureau of Industry Cooperation, FTC, dated March 5, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
200. In connection with the Cosmetic Industry Rules, the Toilet Goods A_s'n varned
its members last year that irreparable harm might face the industry unless there was
general cooperation with the FTC on the rules. The Association noted that although
the FTC had thus far been lenient, a careful check on compliance and crackdovn t-n
the many violators could eventually be expected. Drug Trade News, March 31, 1952,
p. 4. Real enforcement of the Cosmetic Rules has been postponed pending the outcome
of the intra-FTC fight over the "voluntary settlement" proposal. Food, Drug & Cos-
metics Reports W-5, Nov. 8, 1952.
201. See notes 116, 117 supra.
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the only party plaintiff in all areas in which it operates, even these rules might be
irrelevant in litigation except as a guide to its enforcement staff. The Com-
mission never uses rules to prosecute and, presumably as a matter of good
faith, would not bring an action against one whose conduct is in compliance
with the rules. However, along with the Commission, the Justice Depart-
ment and private parties may sue for violations of the antitrust acts 2 02 and,
it is possible that private litigants will also be able to sue in federal courts
for deceptive practices and unfair competition. 20 3 These actions will raise the
issue of the status of the trade rule in litigation, for private parties plaintiff
may wish to introduce the rule as evidence that a defendant's activities are
illegal. Or private parties defendant may wish to set up compliance with the
rule as defense to a charge of illegal conduct.
Deceptive Practices and Unfair Competition: The Lanhant Act
Until recently, a businessman usually could not restrain another's false
advertising or deceptive promotion of a competing product, although his own
sales may have been seriously injured. Generally, only where the competitor
was deceptively "passing off" his goods as the products of the complaining
firm or group could the deceptive practice be enjoined or damages recover-
ed.204 Exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the specific prohibitions of deceptive
practices contained in the FTC Act has rested with the Commission.20 5 The
Lanham Act of 1946, however, although aimed principally at trade-martk
protection, may also give private parties powerful federal remedies to control
all types of unfair or deceptive practices affecting interstate commerce.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act gives any person "who believes he is
likely to be damaged" by a competitor's use of any "false description or repre-
sentation" of goods a claim for damages or an injunction. 20 Similar relief
is provided by Section 44,207 as protection against acts condemned in the
Paris 208 and Inter-American 20 9 conventions on trade-marks and unfair compe-
tition. In addition to general provisions in both treaties requiring signatory
202. Clayton Act, §§ 4, 15, 16, 38 STAT. 736-7 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 25, 26 (1946).
203. See note 219 infra.
204.' See note 76 supra.
205. Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat. Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass, 1949),
aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950). A strong argument that the Comnls.
sion's jurisdiction is not exclusive, and that private actions may be brought to enforce
the prohibitions of § 5 of the Act, is made in Bunn, The Nalional Law of Unfair
Competition, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 987 (1949). This article has been cited with apparent
aprpoval in Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, 193 F2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1951),
and Radio Shack Corp. v. Radio Shack, Inc., 180 F.2d 200, 202 n.1 (7th Cir. 1950).
206. 60 STAT. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946).
207. §§ 44(b), (h), (i), 60 STAT. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1126(b), (h), (i) (1946).
208. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PRO'ERTi,
53 STAT. 1768 (1934).
209. GENRAL INTER-AmmucAN CONVENTION FOR TRADE MARK AND COMMERCIAL
PROTEcTIoN, 46 STAT. 2907. (1929).
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powers to protect nationals of other treaty powers from "any act contrary
to honest practice"2 10 or "contrary to commercial good faith,"2" the Inter-
American treaty specifically condemns the use of "false descriptions of goods
by words, symbols, or other means tending to deceive the public . . . with
respect to the nature, quality, or utility of the goods."212' Remedies provided
in the Lanham Act 213 to enforce these provisions are available to foreign
nationals of signatory nations and American citizens alike.214
The precise effect of these sections of the Lanham Act on private actions
is still uncertain. Following several court interpretations that emasculated
Section 43 (a) as broad authority for private suits,2 15 plaintiffs shifted to Sec-
tion 44 as support for their actions. In Stauffer v. E.rley2 lc-the only con-
trolling Court of Appeals interpretation-the Ninth Circuit held that Section
44 does create a federal action for unfair competition.2 17 Since the section
210. Treaty, supra note 203, Art. 10 bis (2), 53 ST.T. 17-0 (1934).
211. Treaty, supra note 209, Art. 21, 46 STr.%. 2930 (1929).
212. "The following are declared to be acts of unfair competition and unless other-
wise effectively dealt with under the domestic laws of the Contracting States shall te
repressed under the provisions of this Convention:
"(a) 
...
"(b) The use of false descriptions of goods, by words, symbols, or other means
tending to deceive the public in the country where the acts occur, with respect to the
nature, quality, or utility of the goods. . . ." Id. Art. 21, 46 STr. 2932 (1929).
213. Federal district courts have power to grant injunctions and rcquire reports of
compliance in order to prevent violation of rights to be protected by the Act. 69 ST.%T.
439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1946). Whiere a violation of these rights has been
established, a plaintiff may recover, in so far as would be equitable, (1) the defendant's
profits, (2) the plaintiff's damages, (3) the costs of the action. 60 ST.AT. 439.40 (1943),
15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1946).
214. 60 STAT. 441-3 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1126(b), (h), (i) (1946). These com-
bined provisions apply to actions between citizens of the United States and provide the
same federal remedies available to a foreigner sueing an American citizen. See March,
Unfair Competition Defined, 37 T.M. REP. 731, 735-6 (1947).
215. See Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat. Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 2L (D.
Mass. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 180 F2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (section tans only such
false descriptions or representations "as are of substantially the same economic nature as
those which involve infringement . . . of trade-marks"; it should not h used to cover
practices already banned by the FTC Act). See California Apparel Creators v.
Vieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d S93, 900-1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 332 U.S. 816 (1947),
criticized in Callman, False Adz'rtising as a Compcfit'e, Tort, 43 Col. L _Ri'. 876, '3A
(1948). The scope of § 43(a) may well be extensively litigated in uther circuits in
actions for personal injuries sustained as a result of using products whose properties are
deceptively or falsely described. Cf. Carpenter v. Rohun & Haas Co., 109 F. Supp. 739
(D. Del. 1952).
216. 184 F2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950).
217. "[A]ny citizen or resident may invoke in the United States District Court, for
acts of unfair competition, whatever appropriate remedies would be available under the
Act if infringement of a registered trade-mark were charged." Id. at 94. "Effective
protection against unfair competition is clearly essential to give effect to the International
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property... and the General Inter-American
Convention for Trade-Mark and Commercial Protection. . . ." bid.
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covers deceptive practices and false advertising as well, private parties may
sue in federal courts also on these grounds. 218 Subsequent district court
opinions in other circuits have disagreed,219 and the Second Circuit has
218. "So far as the conventions declare specific acts and practices unlawful a more
or less definite area has been established [for rights created in the Lanham Act], but so
far as interpretation of designedly broad terms is concerned" the meaning to be given
"unfair competition" is constantly changing. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d
339, 342 (9th Cir. 1952). For example of specific acts condemned in the Conventions,
see note 212 supra.
219. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Gibson Lighter Mfg. Co., 108 F. Supp, 755
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Hosid Products, Inc. v. Masback, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 753 (ND.N.Y,
1952) ; Old Reading Brewery, Inc. v. Lebanon Valley Brewing Co., 102 F. Supp. 434
(M.D. Pa. 1952); Ross Products, Inc. v. Newman, 94 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
The conclusion of the Stauffer case was rejected on two grounds: (1) a broad federal
substantive law of unfair competition under the Lanham Act is inconsistent with § 1338
of the Judicial Code enacted two years, later, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (Supp. 1952); (2)
an unwillingness to interpet the Lanham Act as making so "radical" a change in existing
law in the'absence of "clear and unmistakable language." Section 1338 provides that the
"district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of
unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright,
patent, or trade-mark laws" (emphasis added). And in general, it codifies the rule
established by judicial decision in Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). The contents
of § 1338 were suggested by Professor J. W. Moore to overcome a restrictive Second
Circuit interpretation of the Hitrn decision. See Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, 189
F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir. 1951). The final text of § 1338 was completed and printed in
the Final Draft of the proposed Judicial Code prior to the passage of the Lanham Act,
60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072 et seq. (1946). Mooan's Co01MENTARY or 'ru
U.S. JuDiciAL CoDE 64, 65 (1949) and the draftsmen did not discuss the then-pending
Lanham Act. See Communication to the YALE LAw JoumNAL from Professor J. W.
Moore, Member, Advisory Committee on the Judicial Code, dated April 23, 1953, in
Yale Law Library. Nor, in considering § 1338, did Congress note the possible conflict
with the substantive provisions of the Lanham Act, nor the lack of need for § 1338
following the passage of the Lanham Act. The section was passed as submitted by its
draftsmen. The reconciliation of the "conflict" in Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962, 9f5
(9th Cir. 1950), by giving § 1338 independent significance as to pendant claims arising
from transactions not affecting interstate commerce, although somewhat strained, seems
much preferable to the district court's opinion that the broad rights claimed under the
Lanham Act would make § 1338 a "nullity" and therefore the Lanham Act private stits
should not be permitted. Ross Products, Inc. v. Newman, 94 F. Supp. 566, 567 (S.D.N,Y,
1950). The district court argument-also supported by some commentators, e.g., 64
HARV. L. REv. 1209 et seq. (1951)--completely ignores the legislative history of § 1338,
Moreover, while legislative intent of § 44 of the Lanham Act may be considered clouded
-Note, Trade-Marks, Unfair Competition, and the Courts: Some Unsettled Aspects ,
the Lanham Act, 66 HAIv. L. REv. 1094, 1102 (1953)-viewing § 1338 as an implied
repeal of § 44(i) seems wholly unwarranted when its background is posed against the
stated general intent of the Lanham Act: "The intent of this Act is to regulate coin.
merce within the control of Congress,... to protect persons engaged in such commerce
against unfair competition . . . and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties
and conventions respecting trade-marks, trade names and unfair competition entered into
between the United States and foreign nations" 60 STAT. 444 (1946), 15 U.SC. § 1127
(1946). No judicial alarm should necessarily arise over combination of unfair competi.
tion substantive laws with trade-mark legislation: the American concept of unfair
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avoided a ruling.2 ° But in any event, at least in the Ninth Circuit, private
actions under the Lanham Act do exist, and this is in accord with the views
of most writers.221
Since the private proceeding under the Lanham Act is relatively new, the
legal status of the trade rules in such proceedings has not yet been adjudicated.
Doctrinally, the trade rule represents only the view of an enforcement agency
and the consensus of an industry-a view which has neither the status of a
court decision nor an FTC finding of fact in a particular adversary proceed-
ing that a specific practice is deceptive. Consequently, violation of a rule can
not itself be sufficient to constitute a per se violation of the Lanham Act; nor
would compliance with a rule bind courts to assert that no violation of the
Act has occurred. Nevertheless, in practice, the trade rule may generally have
these effects, at least in situations where rules cover deceptive practices which
have not been directly examined in prior court opinions or Commission
orders.
When confronted with conflicting claims as to whether or not an advertise-
ment or sales practice is deceptive or a false description, the trier's determina-
tion of the issue rests largely upon whether an ordinary, trusting purchaser,
relying on the fair meaning of an advertisement or sales representations would
be misled as to the nature or quality of the product. - 2 Unless conflicting
standards generally accepted by the public were introduced-a difficult type
of proof 22 3 -the rule provision may be the only relevant indication, for ex-
ample, of the meaning generally given certain descriptive terminology or the
competition originates from the cases which relate to the appropriation of trade marl::
and trade names. Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L Rr,. 9S7,
1001; Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition, 2N YALE L.J. 1 (1919) ; Jones,
Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YAL LJ. 42, 297, 351
(1926).
22-0. Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F2d 416, 421 (2d Cir.
1952) ; Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, 193 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1951 ) ; Cuttin
Room Appliances Corp. v. Empire Cutting Mach. Co., 185 F2d 997, 999 (2d Cir. 1951);
Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Comet Import Corp., 103 F. Supp. 531, 532 (S.D.X.Y.
1952).
221. See, e.g., Caliman, False Advertising as a Compeitive Tort, 43 COL. L RLA.
876, 8 86-7 (194) ; Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks. 14 LAw -
Cor=P. PRoB. 200 (1949); Ladas, Trade-Marks and Foreign Trade, 33 T.M. RF1.
278, 288 (1948); Lunsford, Unfair Competition: Scope of the Lanham Act, 13 U. oy
Prrr. L. Rm-. 533, 540, 542 (1952).
222. See note 227 infra. The trade practice conference procedure -%as originally
conceived by the Commission as a means of obtaining from industry e:ipressions of
trade opinion ("submittals"), from which the Commission might, in its discretion, iormu-
late standards for proper use of terms dealing with quality and content of industry
products. The violation of the standards would constitute the unfair mth fos of com-
petition the FTC had power to prevent. FTC Tr,%m Pvkc-rrt7E SLm T'r.%Ls 7 (1425).
discussed in GAsiml 110.
223. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 125 F.2d 917
(2d Cir. 1942), modified, 37 F. T. C. 824 87-8 (2d Cir. 1943).
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affirmative disclosures which the purchaser relies upon in interpreting ad-
vertisements or examining goods. In these situations getting the rule before
the court should not be difficult. Since a large percentage of the members of
an industry usually formally acknowledge their acceptance of the rules as an
industry code of competitive practices, 2" the rules may well be admitted as
evidence of prevailing custom and usage. Or a rule may be admissible as an ad-
mission against interest of a party who has assented to it.225 Conceivably, courts
might even spell out a doctrine of estoppel: a plaintiff who, with other industry
members, has assented to the rules may be estopped from asserting that prac-
tices in compliance with the rule are illegal; and conversely, a defendant may
be estopped from challenging a rule to which he has assented as a valid standard
of deception. In any event, the rule will be influential: it may constitute the
only easily obtainable evidence, and it carries the weight of Commission ex-
pertise and common assent of industry members in an area where confusion
might otherwise predominate. Should the courts pay the same deference to
the rules as they currently do to Commission findings of deception in FTC pro-
ceedings, 22  rules may generally be enforcible de facto, regardless of their
official legal status.
Antitrust Violations
Both the Justice Department and private litigants, as well as the FTC, are
authorized to bring actions against violators of the antitrust laws. The issue
of the status of the trade rule in such proceedings has not arisen, howoever,
224. Kittelle & Mostow, A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences of the Federal
Trade Commission, 8 GEo. WAsH. L REv. 427, 449 (1940). And see notes 193, 124 supra,
225. There appears to be no case support for this proposition. But at least one
commentator has expressed this view: "The fact that such conduct is denounced by a
rule is not even properly admissible in evidence against a respondent unless it can be
shown that he in some manner or another acquiesced in the propriety of such rule or
agreed to abide by it (as by signing an 'acceptance' form)." Weil, FTC's lnduslry
Rules: How Do They Affect You?, Printer's Ink, Sept. 2, 1949, pp. 42, 47. Since the
Commission apparently seeks to avoid use of acceptance cards in its formal litigation,
see note 147 supra, they are apparently used as a psychological aid in obtaining voluntary
compliance and quick settlement of violations informally by rules administration. Since
use of acceptances as admissions in private litigation might decrease drastically those
firms signing the cards, the FTC would probably oppose the release of information as
to who has and who has not signed such cards after a conference.
226. See note 24 supra. When considering FTC findings that a particular practice is de-
ceptive courts have stated: "[T]he findings of the Commission [are] conclusive as to the facts
if supported by testimony. The Courts cannot pick and choose bits of evidence to make findings
of fact contrary to the findings of the Commission." Federal Trade Commission v. Stand-
ard Education Soc. 302 U.S. 112, 117 (1937). See also Mary Muffet, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 194 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1952); Hillman Periodicals, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 174 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1949); Segal v. Federal Trade Commission,
142 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,
139 F2d 200 (2d Cir. 1943). In the same way, the trade rules might represent a finding
of fact by the Commission that all practices within a category are deceptive.
[Vol. 62: 912
TRADE RULES
since the recent Robinson-Patman rules mark the FTC's first important ven-
ture beyond restatement of antitrust statutory provisions.
The trade rule is likely to be of considerably less weight in antitrust
proceedings than in the deceptive practice field. Whereas the deceptive
practice cause of action rests largely upon custom and usage and
judgments as to public reaction, - 7 these factors are generally irrele-
vant to the antitrust cause of action. At the same time, it is unlikely the
courts will evolve estoppel doctrines built around the rules: estoppel is virtu-
ally dead in the antitrust field32 8 Nor would compliance with a rule be a
sound defense: good motives rarely insulate an antitrust violator from
succesful attack.2 9 Since evidentiary relevance of the rule is thus difficult to
establish, entry of the rule under an admission against interest theory serves
no purpose. As a result, the trade rule can only be effective by virtue of
the stature accorded an FTC interpretation of law, possibly through a device
such as judicial notice, or through completely "non-legal" channels that might
influence a court. This effect may be negligible as well, for pre-litigation
interpretations of antitrust laws are given little credance: The Justice Depart-
ment, for example, cautions all parties that they abide by Department inter-
pretations at their own risk. - 0 And, contrary to traditional attitudes in the
deceptive practice field, there is little reason to expect court deference to FTC
rulings. Courts have always been the supreme arbiters in antitrust law
interpretation-a power which they may jealously guard. However, the
trade rule may have some effect because of the peculiar headaches raised by
Robinson-Patman: problems are sufficiently difficult and so confused that a
court may welcome practical, well-considered interpretations of the Act and
apply them as its own.
The possibility that courts may give little or no weight to Robincon-
Patman interpretative rules theoretically weakens the Conference Program
in this area. Presumably, since reliance on the rules will not insulate parties
from attack of private litigants or the justice Department, willingness to
adopt pricing and promotional methods in reliance on the FTC's interpreta-
tions may be considerably lessened. However, as a practical matter, this may
not occur: the justice Department has generally left the Robinson-Patman
field to the FTC alone,2' and private litigants are reluctant to sue unless prior
227. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Soc., S6 F. 2d 692, 696 (2d
Cir. 1936), rev'd, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937); Heller & Son v. Federal Trade Commissiun,
191 F2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951). For full discussion, see 1 CALLUAN. 340-7.
228. Comment, Antitrust Eniforcemcnt by Private Parties: A4nalysis of Dczclopnicnts
in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1011, 1029-33 (1952).
229. E.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457
(1941) (purpose of combating aclmowledged tort of "style piracy" does not justify cum-
bination to boycott tortfeasor copyists). And see sources cited in Comment, stipra note
228.
230. Industry sources.
231. Note, Czai Stores Under the Shcrman Act, 47 COL L. RE%. 7 t., 795 (1947).
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Government actions against prospective defendants have paved the way. 32
To make sure that a firm will not risk prosecution for action in reliance on
the Commission's rules, Commissioner Mason has suggested an immunity
statute,233 replete with elaborate provisions by which such immunity could be
withdrawn by either FTC or Justice Department action if the need arises.3 4
Passage of such a statute, perhaps with slight modifications, 235 should facilitate
drafting of Robinson-Patman rules for individual industries to promote, so
far as possible under the Act, competitive conditions consistent with a coherent
antitrust program.
Impact
The use of trade practice rules in court proceedings may result in consider-
able modification of business attitudes toward projected conferences for their
industry.236 As a result of Lanham Act proceedings, those agreeing to
"custom-made" rules in the past because they believed that FTC enforcement
would be ineffective must now consider the threat of private litigation based
on specific rule determinations. Firms whose skepticism toward rule making
232. Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1011, 1060 (1952).
233. Mason Proposes Industry Assume Liability for Trade Practices; Model Bill
Drawn Up, Oil Paint & Drug Rep., Oct. 20, 1947, p. 3. Apparently no effort has as yet
been made to secure congressional enactment of the bill. INrERVIaWS.
234. Under the proposed statute, conferences could be recommended by either the
Secretary of Commerce or the Commission, with notice being given to the Attorney
General, who could cancel the proposed conference by certifying it was not in the public
interest (Q 2). If there is no adverse report from the Attorney General, the FTC would
investigate the industry (§ 3). If the Attorney General objects to a rule, and the FTC
does not withdraw it, he may institute proceedings in equity to enjoin acts done in com-
pliance with such rule 90 days after objection was filed with the FTC. The FTC will
conform rules to the final decision in such litigation (Q 5). Except for the above, no
action, civil or criminal, Governmental or private, under the federal antitrust laws shall
be maintained for any act or omission to act resulting from conformity by any signa-
tory thereto with any rule (§ 7). Draft of Legislation Proposed by Commissioner
Mason, 1947, copy in Yale Law Library.
235. It would perhaps be more appropriate if the FTC were required to suspend
any rule during Justice Department litigation on legality of conduct in compliance with
it. Sheltering firms under an FTC interpretation pending a final decision by the courts
(id. § 5) seems to give too much discretion to the FTC to decide what practices are to
be permitted and encouraged in contradiction to Justice Department views on tile
requirements of the antitrust laws.
236. Widespread requests from industries for conferences indicate a generally favor-
able attitude toward the current conference program among many groups not presently
covered by rules. See note 199 supra. However, there is considerable sentiment against
conferences for a variety of reasons: e.g., undesirability of any "unnecessary" Govern.
ment involvement in control of competitive conditions; fear that FTC investigations in
connection with rule formulation will lead to the industry being "harassed" with prosecu-
tions; a belief that the program is mere "empire building" by the FTC; and a general
distrust and dislike of any contact with Government lawyers not necessitated by severe
problems of unfair practices with the industry. 1952 INDUSaRv SURvaY OF RULES.
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derived from a low opinion of the Commission's effectiveness might now give
the rule program increased support. More careful scrutiny of the content of
proposed rules can be expected at the very least. Other effects on the con-
ference program are problematical.
CONCLUSION
The scope of deceptive practice, unfair competition, and antitrust regula-
tion is so vast that any agency-let alone an understaffed one-faces an
almost impossible task of administration.m7 Enforcement against individual
offenders must, because of the size of the job, depend primarily on effectuating
industry-wide compliance either through the deterrent effect of selective en-
forcement or the good faith of industry members in obeying federal laws. But
in highly competitive areas, as long as some can effectively evade proiecution
or postpone enforcement orders, business pressures operate in devastating
fashion to tax good faith heavily and weaken whatever deterrent is created
by spasmodic prosecution of selected industry members. Difficulty is com-
pounded since individual enforcement must operate in a fighly fluid business
world displaying rapid changes of practice. When the members of a particular
industry are continually confronted with competitors' questionable but not
clearly illegal practices, good faith and fear of prosecution may disappear
entirely as motives to refrain from similar practices. Experience indicates all
too well that even a much enlarged FTC staff with individual informal enforce-
ment procedures cannot effectively regulate in many of these problem areas.
The FTC's Trade Conference Progran proceeds upon a psychological basis
entirely different from individual enforcement. In one sense, the Coummission
creates the situation where an industry can police itself, both in publicizing
237. See notes 7, 8, and 10 supra. A recent study reported: "FTC, in Ehwrt, aa t-J
be at once impartial judge, mentor, fount of knowledge, and defender of the faith....
This is a job for a Commission of gods, and anything less may be readily ,ardoncd
for not achieving perfection." Zealous Men of FTC, Fortune, Feb. 1952, pp. 107-S. E, ui
where rules have been promulgated, rule administration is a fantastic task for an 11-man
unit. E.g.: "The Commission has 179 sets of industry rules under administration com-
prising 2,393 Group I and Group II rules, involving 954,393 individual members, -with
a total annual dollar volume of business of over $75 billion." FTC Am-=. Rrnx. 64 (1952).
FTC receives aid in the control of deceptive advertising from privately organized L-.tt.r
business bureaus, which, although without the legal authority of the FTC, can act v.ith
extreme dispatch and achieve considerable results without direct appeal to law. SrHnp
& Fox, BusiEss ETHIcs 257-61 (1937); Churchill, Eye for Business, N.Y. Times
Mag., Nov. 18, 1951, pp. 31-2; Hartwell, Sucker's Best Friend, Collier's, Oct. 30, 1943,
p. 44. State legislation aimed at control of deceptive advertising has proved largely
ineffectual, except in outlawing the most blatant falsehoods. 1 CALLz.it: 2 .t Restritcd
regulatory or administrative authority over certain kinds of advertising fraud or misrepre-
sentation is scattered among several federal departments and agencies--e.g., Mcohol Tax
Unit, Post Office Department, and United States Public Health Service. For discussion
of their activities in this connection, see GEU.er, ADvunrTsxNG AT TIM CrW5Sr.Q.%s:
FESERAL REGULATION vs. VOLUTARY CONTROLS 213-52, 267 (1952).
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what practices are currently in vogue to enable formulation of relevant trade
rules, and in guarding against subsequent violations of the rules. Of course,
lurking in the background is the threat of FTC sanctions, an essential back-
stop for a successful trade rule program.238 But while these may be necessary
to insure that preventative action will be taken against offenders, and thus
that good faith adherents to the rules will not suffer competitively, the Con-
ference Program ultimately depends upon industry cooperation. Patently,
since problems may be industry-wide and consequently unmanageable by even
an enlarged enforcement agency, reliance upon industry cooperation and
self policing is a sensible device.
Danger is involved, however, in the process of drafting "custom-made"
rules. To facilitate efforts to secure voluntary compliance with the rules, the
FTC apparently goes to great lengths to draft rules which will be generally
acceptable to the industry.2m 9 This could lead the Commission into a willing-
ness to give unreserved aid to participating firms alarmed over "deceptive,"
"unfair," or "cut throat" practices of others. Yet prohibitions of many of the
practices which are so termed may be unnecessary limitations on the range of
competitive methods.240 At the same time, should the FTC provide, as it
did in the past, a quasi-official sanction for agreements violating the antitrust
laws, industry-wide conferences would definitively defeat their very purposes.
Currently, the considerable care with which the Commission formulates the
rules indicates that its staff is well aware of these problems, and no present
abuses are readily discernible.241 The future might witness opposite results.
238. Since a significant portion of firms complying with FTC trade rules after their
promulgation do so because of fear of FTC prosecution or a desire to avoid any lesser
entanglements with the Commission, 1953 JouRNAl. SURVEY, a strong enforcement arm
seems essential to the success of the conference program. See FTC TRANSCI'r, HEAR-
INGS ON Timm) D iamccY APPROPRIATION BILL FoR 1946, p. 9 (June 7, 1946), copy
in Yale Law Library.
239. There appear to be virtually no complaints from industry that the FTC custom-
made rules are unacceptable to the industry. 1952 INDUSTRY SuavaY or RULES. But cf.
recent turmoil over rules in New England heating oil industry, note 172 supra.
240. A possible example of such industry views as to "unfair trade practices" are
the "Teu Commandments" for oil jobbers distributed by the Iowa Independent Oil Job-
bers Ass'n which include:
"1. It is unfair to invade a competitor's territory when you are selling at a lower
price in your bulk plant area than your competitor who is operating in the adjacent ter-
ritory when he might have a normal price.
"2. It is an unfair trade practice to loan pumps or tanks to the consuming public,
which in turn forces the competitor to do likewise and in the end you both indulged in un-
profitable merchandising....
"7. It is unfair for any supplier or jobber to offer long term credit to a competitor's
customer in order to get the account. .. ."
National Petroleum News, Dec. 28, 1949, p. 35.
241. See, e.g., views of the FTC's chief economist and Director of its Bureau of Industry
Economics, EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 2 (1952); Zealous Men of FTC,
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But to some extent, this danger is minimized by the fact tlt other enforcers
such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Justice Department, and
private parties, constitute checks on FTC rule-making.
As it is now operating, the Trade Conference Program gives considerable
promise for effective enforcement of many FTC functions. Of course, the
program is not a panacea. It probably will not be effective in certain areas,
such as those involving direct door to door selling where business firms
purportedly exercise little control over the antics of their salesmen.-2 -
Moreover, should FTC spread itself too thin with too many conferences, should
rules not be kept up to date, or should careful checks on rule compliance be
waived, the Conference Program will become nothing but a ritual. Perhaps,
in many areas of the economy, this is the program's current effect because of
the undermanned FTC forces: an eleven-inan Rules Administration Unit is
somewhat farcical. If the Commission staff is increased and operates the
Conference Program within limitations geared to its size, there is every reason
to anticipate fruitful results.
j
Fortune, Feb., 1952, pp. 107, 132. In fact, implied criticism was voicd against the Commis-
sion's complete control over rule formulation at the present time by Veil, FTC's Trade
Practice Rules: How Do They Affcct You?, Printer's Ink, Sept. 2, 1949, pp. 42, 4!). In
contrast, during the period of rule abuse in the late 1920's, FTC permitted indutry t.j
control rule content. In fact, a loud outcry vws raised in 1929 wh rite Coo.
dropped a provision submitted by an industry and substituted a new one ,uf its ou.,.n
devising. GAsxIzm 119.
242. See note 198 supra.
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